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INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW:
THE REGULATION OF HOW MARKET-
MOVING INFORMATION IS REVEALED
Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson†
Corporate information that moves stock-market prices sits
at the center of modern securities regulation.  The Great De-
pression-era securities laws at the foundation of the field re-
quire much mandatory disclosure of this type of information.
They also include a strict anti-fraud regime to ensure the credi-
bility of those disclosures of that information.  And for a half
century now, that regime has been interpreted to prohibit in-
siders from trading on the same information.
Today, a new body of securities law is emerging on top of
this regulatory structure built around corporate information.
That body—which we call “information-dissemination law”
(IDL)—focuses on how important information is revealed to the
market.  The current defining feature of IDL is found in require-
ments that such information must be disseminated to all in-
vestors at the same exact time in the name of ordinary-
investor fairness.  Yet, using a market-microstructure-based
understanding of securities markets, our analysis shows that
the ordinary-investor benefits of such equal-timing efforts are
far from clear.  Indeed, it shows that simultaneity is per-
versely harming the most vulnerable ordinary investors.  Ac-
cordingly, the Article defines this nascent area of law, subjects
its fairness rhetoric to economic realities, and explores ways
in which it might be reformed to further its primary stated goal
or those of the field more generally—or even better, both.
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1375 R
I. AN EMERGING AREA OF SECURITIES REGULATION
AND ITS PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1384 R
A. The Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1385 R
1. Reg FD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1386 R
2. Recent Expansions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1386 R
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative . . . . . 1387 R
† Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law, and
Michael J. Marks Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Research Scholar,
University of Chicago Law School, respectively.
1373
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 2 19-SEP-16 16:03
1374 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1373
b. New York State Attorney General’s
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1389 R
B. The Policy Rationales Behind the Law . . . . . . . . 1392 R
1. Reg FD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1392 R
a. Making Securities Markets Fairer for
Ordinary Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1392 R
b. Boosting Investor Confidence in the
Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1393 R
c. Enhancing the Quality of the Price-
Discovery Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1394 R
2. Recent Expansions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1395 R
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative . . . . . 1395 R
b. New York State Attorney General’s
Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1396 R
II. A MODEL OF KEY ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK
MARKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1397 R
A. Four Main Types of Traders. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1398 R
1. Information Traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1398 R
2. Portfolio Traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1401 R
3. Noise Traders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1403 R
4. Professional-Liquidity-Providing Traders . . . 1405 R
B. Information Asymmetries and the Main Costs
It Imposes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1408 R
III. THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF IDL ON ORDINARY INVESTORS’
WELLBEING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1411 R
A. Effects on Information Asymmetries in the
Market Generally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1411 R
1. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release
Periods When Simultaneity is Required . . . . 1412 R
2. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release
Periods that Would Exist if Tiered
Dissemination Were Allowed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1414 R
3. Conclusion as to the Overall Effects of
Simultaneity on Information Asymmetries
Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1416 R
B. Effects on the Wellbeing of Specific Groups of
Ordinary Investors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1419 R
1. Group #1: Ordinary Investors Who Engage
in Portfolio Trading at Random Times . . . . . 1419 R
2. Group #2: Ordinary Investors Who Benefit
from Portfolio Trading that Seeks to Detect
and Avoid the Moments After Information
Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1424 R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 3 19-SEP-16 16:03
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 1375
3. Group #3: Ordinary Investors Who Are
Duped into Portfolio Trading or Noise
Trading in the Moments After Information
Releases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1427 R
IV. REFORMING IDL WITH AN EYE ON ITS PRINCIPAL STATED
GOAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1430 R
A. Disclosure of Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1431 R
B. Set Information-Release Windows with an
Information-Dissemination Shot Clock . . . . . . . 1433 R
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1439 R
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, regulators have repeatedly decreed
that they would end what was quickly becoming a routine prac-
tice: the release of market-moving information to some inves-
tors just prior to the time at which it was being made available
to the entire public.  The most prominent examples of regula-
tory efforts in the area during this period involved the New York
State Attorney General (NYAG) and the University of Michigan.
Michigan had been releasing bimonthly revisions to its Index of
Consumer Sentiment to high-speed traders just seconds before
making them widely available.  The famous index contains val-
uable information on consumers’ views on the direction of the
economy.  For that reason, media and information giant Thom-
son Reuters agreed to pay Michigan over $1 million in return
for the right to be the exclusive disseminator of index updates
in 2014.1  Pursuant their contract, Thomson then released in-
dex revisions to paying customers before making them widely
available to the public.  Thus, Thomson was earning revenues
in return for providing early access to new market-moving in-
formation to those who valued it.
Whether to benefit the robustness of research or that of the
football team, there is no doubt that Michigan could have le-
gally traded on its work product two seconds, hours, days,
weeks, or months before releasing it to the public.  Thomson
could have done the same unless the parties’ contract provided
a basis for concluding otherwise.  But these obvious legal con-
clusions did not stop the top state-level cop of Wall Street from
declaring the early-release practice and 1,200 or so similar
ones to constitute “Insider Trading 2.0,” and putting an end to
1 See Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early Peeks at Key Index,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 7, 2013, 9:06 p.m.), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/07/07/thomson-reuters-to-suspend-early-peeks-at-key-index/ [https://
perma.cc/XRZ4-NUVC].
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them after investigations that resulted in cease and desist
agreements.2
This recent initiative (as well as another prominent one by
the SEC)3 is not an isolated incident.  For just over a decade
and a half, the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure (commonly
known as “Reg FD”) has required public companies to make
material information available to all investors at the same exact
time when first disseminating it beyond the firm.  But the issue
of informational parity, a central concern of the SEC since the
New Deal, is broader than these examples.  The SEC continues
to be engaged in a years-long review of a controversial practice
whereby trading firms “co-locate” their computer servers next
to the servers that run securities exchanges.  The proximity
between servers allows those firms’ algorithms to learn of trad-
ing activity at exchanges milliseconds before others.  The
agency is also undergoing a review of a similar issue involving
that same trading-activity information, albeit one that centers
on distinct brief time lags: the ones between the time at which
paying subscribers (whether they co-locate or not) receive the
information and that at which the public receives it.  Additional
behind-the-scenes pressures for equal timing relating to mar-
ket-moving information undoubtedly exist.
These examples of initiatives to regulate how and when
market-moving information is disseminated to the public are
not simply political stunts.  Rather, they appear to be genuinely
2 See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Marketwired Agreement to End Sales of
News Feeds to High-Frequency Traders, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Mar. 19,
2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-
marketwired-agreement-end-sales-news-feeds-high-frequency [https://
perma.cc/3784-NZEF] [hereinafter Schneiderman Announces]; A.G. Schneiderman
Secures Agreement by Thomson Reuters to Stop Offering Early Access to Market-
Moving Information, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (July 8, 2013), http://
www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-agreement-thomson-
reuters-stop-offering-early-access-market [https://perma.cc/9Q2V-BW84] [here-
inafter Schneiderman Agrees].  In the former press release, Schneiderman stated
that the accord was “part of . . . [his] efforts to end Insider Trading 2.0—the
practice of providing preferred, technologically sophisticated traders with early
access to market-moving information.” Schneiderman Announces, supra.  We
know of no entity offering these types of early releases after the publicized investi-
gations that ended in the two agreements and press releases cited in this note.
3 Another prominent recent initiative relates to the early release of public-
company securities disclosures.  In November 2014, academic researchers, the
Wall Street Journal, and Congress (in that order) noted that some investors were
accessing those filings from the SEC’s website or an SEC information-dissemina-
tion contractor, or both, in the seconds and sometimes even minutes before they
were first posted on the SEC’s website.  Prodded by Congress, the agency found
itself working to ensure the simultaneous revelation of these market-moving
disclosures.
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aimed at a primary goal that is familiar: making the stock mar-
ket fairer for ordinary, long-term investors.  Banning sophisti-
cated market participants from obtaining early access to
information, the argument goes, reduces the asymmetry in val-
uable information known by pros versus that known by ordi-
nary Joes—thereby making participation in the stock market
fairer for the latter.  The initiatives thus embody a sacred tenet
relating to all these individuals who (in the aggregate) supply so
much of the capital that fuels the economy’s largest producers.
The tenet is that ordinary investors should, within reason, be
put on as level of a playing field as possible with sophisticated
speculators when it comes to the ability to make a profit in
securities markets.4
None of the above should surprise us.  With regard to the
market forces, it is clear that there are benefits to being among
the first who are able to obtain, analyze, and trade on informa-
tion that will lead to changes in market prices.  That demand,
in turn, triggers supply, as there is thus revenue to be garnered
by providing market participants with early access to that in-
formation.  And with regard to the regulatory action, the
mandatory-disclosure, securities-fraud, and insider-trading
law that make up the core of modern securities regulation are
motivated in large part by a desire among policymakers to re-
duce these types of information asymmetries.
Against this background, this Article provides something
that the literature has failed to consider with respect to these
early release practices and the legal effort to stop them: a mar-
ket-microstructure-based5 examination of how information
revelation is regulated.  In so doing, it makes three main impor-
tant points.
First, we establish that, taken together, Reg FD and regula-
tory action from the past few years can be viewed as represen-
4 The main ultimate aim of this enhanced fairness appears to be twofold.
First, to ensure a specific instance of fairness: that a core American social institu-
tion (the stock market) is fair.  And second, to encourage investment in the com-
panies that produce so much of the country’s goods and services, thereby—
among other things—lowering their cost of capital and, in turn, it is hoped, the
costs of those goods and services.
5 Market microstructure is a branch of economics that studies the forces at
play between buyers and sellers in markets.  The principles of the field apply
beyond sophisticated markets for the trading of financial instruments.  But they
are mainly applied to those markets—if for no other reason than that relating to
the availability of enormous amounts of data relating to those markets.  For a
seminal treatise on market microstructure authored by a former chief economist
of the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES:
MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 6 (2003).
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tative of an emerging body of securities law.  To date, to the
extent this area of law has been thought about at all, the incli-
nation has been to treat it as an aspect of the mandatory-
disclosure regime (as seen in Regulation Fair Disclosure) or
insider-trading law (as demonstrated by the crack down on
Insider Trading 2.0).  But we argue that the efforts described
above are emblematic of a larger, nascent body of securities law
that can be analytically severed from disclosure and trading
rules.  We call this still emerging body of law “information-
dissemination law” (IDL).  By IDL, we mean the set of rules that
governs exactly when and how information that will be an-
nounced to the public is disseminated.
Second, we argue that the basic fairness premise on which
IDL is being built is unsound.  We show why policymakers have
no basis for claiming that the main simultaneity-based exam-
ples of IDL are enhancing ordinary-investor wellbeing.  In fact,
our analysis reveals that efforts to make securities markets
fairer for ordinary-investor trading may be in fact doing the
opposite, as at least the many individuals who trade directly
through retail-level brokerage houses are likely made worse off
by IDL today.  We also show how some IDL efforts, like those of
the NYAG, harm ordinary investors on the whole.
Third, our review shows that policymakers should think
about crafting IDL that entails far more than basic simultane-
ous-dissemination requirements.  By so doing, the law could
better achieve the current primary stated policy ends of IDL,
while also potentially better furthering the other main end of
modern securities law more generally—enhancing stock-price
accuracy.  To support these points, we offer concrete IDL pro-
posals that would enhance ordinary-investor wellbeing and a
broader conclusion as to how they might be used in conjunc-
tion with another reform to IDL to improve both fairness and
price accuracy at the same time.
To see the main insight of this Article, consider Reg FD, the
centerpiece of IDL.  Reg FD has two distinct, and opposite,
effects on ordinary investors that have been overlooked in the
securities-law literature.  The regulation prohibits firms from
engaging in the once-common practice in which they reveal
new information to selective audiences hours, days, or even
weeks before announcing it to the entire public.  For that rea-
son, throughout sustained periods leading up to the release of
new corporate information, it reduces the risk that some select
group of traders will have superior information that others
lack.  The end result is that the wellbeing of ordinary investors
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who trade in these relatively long pre-release periods is im-
proved.  However, that welfare improvement is only slight as a
general matter because the ratio of informed trading to all other
trading during these periods would generally have likely been
quite low for most publicly traded stocks.6  Ultimately, then,
Reg FD improves ordinary-investor wellbeing during those pro-
longed pre-release periods—but only slightly so because the
information asymmetries it eliminates would generally have
only imposed a slight negative effect on each member of the
enormous herd of ordinary investors in the market during
those periods.
But, in brief post-release periods, Reg FD does something
very different: it dramatically increases and concentrates this
same information asymmetry.  In the seconds after new infor-
mation is made publicly available, those who want to capture a
trading profit based on this information must trade on it imme-
diately, lest the competition beats them to the punch.  Ordinary
investors who trade in this period are made markedly worse off
as the execution of their orders to buy and sell stock are far
more likely to be affected by better-informed pros in those peri-
ods than they would be without the legal intervention.
Stepping back, it becomes clear that the issue of whether
ordinary investors are helped or harmed by Reg FD’s simulta-
neity mandate depends mainly on whether the small gains
from trading in the sustained pre-release periods that are
slightly safer exceed the large losses from trading in shorter,
now far more dangerous post-release periods.  No empirical
study has aimed to quantify these gains and losses, and the
SEC has not supported the rule with any analysis other than a
plea to “fairness.”  Indeed, we know of no previous spotting of
any of these issues whatsoever, as the law’s equal-opportunity
approach appears to have precluded an open conversation
about its true effects in the market.  After all, who could come
out against the equally timed dissemination of important infor-
mation: this approach furthers the least objectionable type of
fairness, since it focuses on opportunities, not outcomes—and
6 As we explain in the Article, in normal times, trading is dominated by the
vast universe of savers who enter and exit positions in order to amass a diversified
portfolio of stocks, balance that portfolio, or liquidate it in whole or part so that
they can use their capital for consumption purposes.  When tiered dissemination
takes place over the course of hours, days, or weeks, better-informed traders aim
to complete their trading without tipping off the rest of the market throughout
those relatively long early-advantage windows.  Thus, their trading would likely be
composed of a stretched out series of small trades throughout a tiered-release
period that is still dominated by portfolio trading.
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it revolves around something our society holds sacred (valuable
information).
But, this is just the tip of the iceberg.  Reg FD, and the
present simultaneity focus of IDL more generally, has two addi-
tional negative consequences.  The regulation gives ordinary
investors reason to believe that they should be investing based
on changes in firm-specific information (they shouldn’t) and
are safe to engage in this trading in post-release windows (they
aren’t).  The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis and Modern
Portfolio Theory demonstrate that ordinary investors can im-
prove their returns for a given level of risk by buying and hold-
ing a diversified portfolio of stocks.  Yet by focusing on making
information dissemination “fair,” the SEC implies that ordinary
investors should be using information to inform stock trades,
despite the proof that this is welfare-decreasing for those
investors.
Moreover, even if ordinary investors try to play the infor-
mation-trading game, the overwhelming majority of them—if
not all of them altogether—are hopelessly outgunned by profes-
sional investors.  Hedge funds, high-speed traders, and other
industry pros trade in millisecond intervals using high-tech
computer algorithms and specialty networks designed to re-
duce trading latency to levels unmatchable by the fastest ordi-
nary investors.  Thus, even if it were a good idea for everyday
investors to trade based on changes in information (and it
isn’t), no reasonable regulation can level the playing field be-
tween an ordinary Jane with an e*Trade account and a high-
speed trader.  IDL’s attempt to make disclosure “fair” and the
policymaker reasoning behind it simply do not hold up under
close inspection.
Our analysis also demonstrates that related reform efforts,
such as that of the NYAG, are unambiguously bad for ordinary
investors.  The prohibition on the early release of market-mov-
ing information (such as in the case of the Michigan Consumer
Sentiment Index) does nothing more than move the costs asso-
ciated with information asymmetry from a seconds-long period
just prior to the public release of information to a similar one
just after that release.  In the end, all the ban has accomplished
is a deprivation of the ability of state universities and the like to
earn revenue in return for their production of valuable informa-
tion—while also, like Reg FD, leading the most vulnerable ordi-
nary investors into value-destroying behavior along the way.
Nevertheless, even if we are right about the ambiguous
effect of Reg FD on ordinary investors, the perverse effect it has
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on the most vulnerable ordinary investors, and the negative
effect the NYAG action has on both, IDL might still be sound
policy for one of three reasons.
First, fairness and wellbeing are two distinct concepts.
Even if Reg FD and its more recent outgrowths now leave ordi-
nary investors worse off, they may still be said to meet the
definition of the former difficult-to-define and intellectually
challenging term.  Although this surely has not been the SEC’s
view of what constitutes fairness (nor ours), perhaps the world
is a “fairer” place when Uncle Bob and Aunt Jane are on a more
equal informational footing with Millennium Capital Manage-
ment LP—no matter what impact that fairness has on the num-
ber at the bottom of their 401(k) statement.
Second, perhaps actual fairness is not the true goal here.
Regulators often speak of improving ordinary-investor confi-
dence in the market in the same breath as improving ordinary-
investor fairness.  If ordinary-investor perceptions of fairness
result in those important market participants having higher
levels of confidence in the market, it is possible that society
should care more about perception than reality.  Although
knowingly indulging in incorrect assumptions about what the
law does and does not do for ordinary investors may be unde-
sirable (especially for a field like securities law that places
much of its focus on deterring false or misleading statements),
perhaps our analysis merely leads to the conclusion that the
status quo should continue.  But if that is the case, discussion
of IDL in policymaking and scholarly circles should be open
and honest about its approach.
Lastly, Reg FD was also explicitly motivated by a concern
about the integrity and competitiveness of the process in which
information about public companies’ prospects become re-
flected in their stocks’ market prices.  Its equal-timing require-
ment for the release of corporate disclosures is thought to
remove the incentive to corruptly provide firms with overly pos-
itive analysis in return for early access to their disclosures,
thereby enhancing the integrity of that price-discovery process.
And that same requirement is also believed to increase the
competiveness of the information-trading business, as anyone
who has the ability and capital necessary to participate in the
business can indeed do so without fear that he will be compet-
ing against other pros who were able to get an early start in the
race to trade on new announcements.  These pricing benefits
might justify even an unfair, intellectually dishonest IDL regime
in which ordinary investors incur higher trading costs—espe-
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cially when those costs are amortized in a relatively even way
across hundreds of millions of savers.  Notably, IDL for price-
accuracy at the expense of fairness is not the stated approach
of any simultaneous-dissemination effort today.
But could IDL be reformed to better achieve its stated ends
as well as those of securities regulation more broadly?  With
regard to the concern for ordinary-investor wellbeing alone, our
analysis makes clear that there are a number of ways in which
IDL could be changed to accomplish this end.  For example, the
law could add on to existing IDL to require the provision of
notice to the market before releasing any potential market-
moving information.  This notice, which we refer to as “disclo-
sure of disclosure,” would allow ordinary investors—whose as-
sembling, balancing, and liquidating of pieces of their
diversified portfolios is generally not time sensitive—to avoid
the dangerous trading environment that ensues after the re-
lease of such information.  Or, the law could tack another over-
lay on IDL: one that mandates set information-release periods
with what we call information-dissemination shot clocks.
Firms and other information producers could be required to
make any important releases of information in, for example,
the first minute of each hour during the middle hours of the
trading day.  So long as the timing and duration of these win-
dows was made clear to the market, at least the savvy would
know to avoid engaging in non-time-sensitive portfolio trading
around the top of each of those hours.
Softer approaches are of course possible too.  Instead of
devoting resources to policing the timing of disclosures, the
SEC could aim to inform investors about the peril of trying to
beat the pros.  Describing the stock market as including two
distinct games—a game for professionals trading on informa-
tion and a game for ordinary investors trading with an eye on a
healthy risk premium—with separate rules of the game for
each would be a nice start to such a campaign.
But there is a serious downside to these types of reforms:
they may reduce the incentive for sophisticated professionals
to produce information about stock’s fundamental values, and
impound it into market prices—thereby harming the other
main goal of securities regulation (improving stock-price accu-
racy).  By helping ordinary investors, each of the contemplated
changes would take away trading profits from the professionals
who analyze new information in order to spot underpriced or
overpriced securities.  Given the long-standing theories as to
the connection between higher levels of stock-price accuracy
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-SEP-16 16:03
2016] INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW 1383
and the efficiency with which capital is allocated and quality
under which corporations are governed,7 society would suffer.
Here, then, is where the real work should begin.  Instead of
superficial appeals to “fairness,” the SEC and academics
should engage in a systematic analysis of the real impact of
these rules on the various aspects of securities practice and
policy.  Intriguing possibilities emerge.  For example, perhaps
IDL should be reformed to allow firms to sell early-access rights
to their disclosures in a well-regulated market for corporate
disclosures.  Such an innovative approach may provide firms
with the incentive to produce more robust disclosure products
to meet market demand for them, while also leaving ordinary
investors better off than they are today under existing IDL
thanks to the addition of disclosure of disclosure or the like.
Price accuracy may be enhanced even if sophisticated specula-
tors stand to make less.  After all, corporate information sits at
the center of the modern securities regulation and its attempt
to improve price accuracy, so improving disclosure of that in-
formation would surely, all else equal, improve price accuracy.
Our analysis also opens the door for other interesting inno-
vations for securities law.  For example, it suggests that the
general ordinary-investor fairness concern that animates a
good amount of legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial thinking
on insider-trading law might be better addressed with, for ex-
ample, set insider trading periods than the current porous en-
forcement regime.  So, it is safe to say that the building blocks
we lay down here have import for not just IDL, but for securi-
ties law as a whole.
The detailed version of the story unfolds as follows.  Part I
identifies and describes IDL as an emerging area of securities
law—animated primarily by the desire to promote ordinary-
investor fairness, but also one to improve the quality of the
price-discovery process.  Part II then provides an overview of
four species of market participants, using principles from mar-
ket microstructure to show how they interact in ways that im-
plicate the design of any regulatory effort to increase ordinary-
investor wellbeing.  Part III considers how these two parts inter-
act, concluding that Reg FD affects ordinary investors ambigu-
7 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013–14
(1984) (providing an overview of the social benefits of enhanced stock-price accu-
racy); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of “Inaccurate” Stock
Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (providing another overview of the social
benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy).
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ously, that the NYAG’s recent action in the area harms ordinary
investors, and that the SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative has an im-
pact that falls somewhere between that of these two other ini-
tiatives (albeit closer to that of the NYAG’s one).  Part IV
discusses these theory’s implications for IDL by thinking about
how our reforms would enhance ordinary-investor wellbeing,
but also whether that end is desirable in this context given
likely trade-offs (namely, those relating to the accuracy of pub-
lic companies’ stock prices).  Finally, the conclusion discusses
why this Article’s analysis of how the revelation of new informa-
tion is regulated opens the door for intriguing innovations for
the field, including the one IDL reform alluded to above that
could perhaps enhance both ordinary-investor fairness and
stock-price accuracy.
I
AN EMERGING AREA OF SECURITIES REGULATION AND ITS PURPOSE
Modern federal securities regulation is mostly about infor-
mation (namely, material corporate information).  But it is com-
posed of several interconnected, yet discrete parts.  The main
foundation comes in the form of the well-known mandatory-
disclosure regime for public companies.  This regime, which
dates to the early 1930s, is designed to ensure that these im-
portant players in the economy produce a wide variety of im-
portant information, and share it with outsiders.  Sitting on top
of the mandatory-disclosure regime are two main overlays: a
far-ranging set of laws that prohibit fraud in connection with
securities transactions8 as well as a number of doctrines to
circumscribe trading by insiders.9  All of these laws are said to
be designed to make markets fairer for ordinary investors10 as
well as to help generate stock prices that better reflect firms’
fundamental values.11
8 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 17, 15
U.S.C. § 77l; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
9 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2012); Rule
10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
240–41 (1980) (interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit “fraudulent”
trading on the basis of material, non-public information by corporate insiders);
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (outlawing the deceitful misappro-
priation of material, non-public information for both insiders and outsiders);
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (outlawing tipping-related behavior).
10 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON, SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 235–36, 1209–11, 1035–37, 1039–42 (6th ed.
2015)
11 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 7, at 979 (noting that this “vast legal frame- R
work” is motivated “by one principal goal of securities laws: . . . creat[ing] stock
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As we show in this Part, in recent years, another one of
these distinct layers that sits on top of the mandatory-disclo-
sure regime has been forming: what we have labeled “informa-
tion-dissemination law.”  IDL seeks to ensure that an ever-
increasing range of market-moving information12 is made
available to all investors at the same exact time when first
being shared with the public.  Like mandatory-disclosure, se-
curities-fraud, and insider-trading law, IDL is focused on ordi-
nary-investor fairness.  In fact, to date, it has been primarily
focused on fairness.  But like those more traditional areas of
regulation in the securities area, at least the main example of
IDL (Reg FD) also focuses on enhancing the accuracy of stocks’
prices.  In this Part, we discern this relatively new area of the
law from the securities law that neighbors it by describing both
rules and legal efforts that compose parts of IDL today, and
then by providing an overview of these policy rationales that
drive them.
A. The Law
The defining—indeed almost exclusive—attribute of IDL to-
day is found in its various simultaneous-dissemination re-
quirements.  The main equal-timing requirement of IDL is
found in Reg FD.13  Promulgated in 2000, that SEC regulation
bars public companies from making disclosures of material
information in a non-simultaneous manner.14  Regulators have
recently expanded on the regulation to cover some instances in
which information was being provided to select groups of mar-
ket participants shortly before it was being more widely re-
markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its fundamental
value.” (footnote omitted)).
12 Our primary focus is on market-moving information as opposed to material
information.  Information “moves markets” when it results in changes to prices
upon being learned by certain market participants.  Information is said to be
material when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
consider it important in deciding whether to purchase, hold, or sell. See TSC
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  For many, the terms
market-moving and material are interchangeable.  But it is worth noting that
some market-moving information may not be of import to “a reasonable investor.”
For example, a large increase in the number of shares posted at the best (highest)
bid prices in the market for IBM stock might move market prices up.  Yet informa-
tion about that change is unlikely to be considered important to a reasonable
investor.  Likewise, some material information may not move market prices.  For
example, some surely consider information about corporate political spending to
be material—even if particular political spending at issue is likely to have no
impact on market prices whatsoever.
13 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).
14 Id.
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leased to the public.  We consider Reg FD and these recent
related legal efforts in turn here.
1. Reg FD
Prior to 2000, firms often revealed information to favored
investors or analysts before disseminating it to the market as a
whole.15  But in that year, the SEC promulgated Reg FD, which
ended this practice by requiring public companies to make
their disclosures of material, not-yet-public information availa-
ble to all potential investors at the same exact time.16
Importantly, this simultaneous-dissemination require-
ment applies to the disclosure of all material corporate infor-
mation—whether or not that disclosure was compelled by law
in the first place.  So, firms must make everything from a man-
dated formal quarterly report with earnings information (a 10-
Q), on the one hand, to a voluntary press release on the CEO’s
asthma (which may or may not be required by the law), on the
other, available to all members of the public at the exact same
time.
Firms can satisfy this equal-timing requirement in a vari-
ety of ways.  For example, they can meet it by providing their
information in: a filing made with the SEC; a press release
through a far-reaching public-relations service; a well-publi-
cized conference call with broad call-in access; or even a post-
ing on social media (including Twitter or Facebook).17  Any
method that “is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclu-
sionary distribution of the information to the public” will do.18
2. Recent Expansions
Over the past few years, both the SEC and the most promi-
nent state-level regulator of Wall Street have pursued initia-
tives to ensure the simultaneous dissemination of market-
moving information in a broader way than that required under
Reg FD.
15 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Reg FD Adopting
Release].
16 See § 243.100  (“Whenever . . . [a public firm] discloses any material non-
public information regarding . . . [itself] or its securities . . . [, it] shall make public
disclosure of that information . . . [s]imultaneously”); Reg FD Adopting Release,
supra note 15, at 51,719 (“As a whole, the regulation requires that when an issuer R
makes an intentional disclosure of material nonpublic information . . . , it must do
so in a manner that provides general public disclosure, rather than through a
selective disclosure.”).
17 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,723–24. R
18 Id. at 51,716.
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a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative
Public firms generally file their required disclosures with
the SEC.  As such, the agency serves as a central repository for
the well over 100,000 disclosures of corporate information that
are made each year.19  Although companies are not required to
make 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, Form 4s, Form 13Ds, and so on
available to the public for the first time through this public-
filing mechanism, they often do.  And that makes sense given
that the SEC has expressly blessed public filing with it as a
means of disclosure that comports with its equal-timing
mandate.20
As securities lawyers know all too well, the process in
which these carefully reviewed statements are made available
to the public by the SEC begins when they are uploaded by
firms and their counsel to the back end of the agency’s Elec-
tronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR) web-
site.21  Less well known—at least until recently—is what
happens behind the scenes between the time at which corpo-
rate disclosures are submitted to EDGAR, and that at which
they become available on the front end of the SEC’s public
EDGAR website.  In November 2014, an academic paper shined
light on that process.22
That academic study, along with another contemporane-
ous one,23 exposed what appears to be an embarrassing glitch
in the handling of all types of disclosures in this time period
between uploading and public availability.  During that gap,
the SEC contractors responsible for disseminating public fil-
19 See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang & Joshua Mitts, How Quickly
Do Markets Learn? Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment 9
(Apr. 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544128
[perma.cc/5HBW-EHMH] (examining a data set of 42,619 filings by public compa-
nies in just a 16-week period in middle of 2014).
20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. R
21 According to the SEC’s website, “EDGAR . . . performs automated collec-
tion, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by compa-
nies and others who are required by law to file forms with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission.” Important Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm
[https://perma.cc/V6ZN-533C].
22 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps Speedy
Traders (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 501, 2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520105 [https://
perma.cc/5YTZ-JKXZ].
23 See Jonathan L. Rogers, Douglas J. Skinner & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Run
EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World (Chicago Booth Paper
No. 14-36, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513350 [https://perma.cc/7K3L-
ET8Y].
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ings in premium-quality formats were routinely distributing
them to a handful of paying subscribers just moments after
they were first uploaded to the SEC website, yet before they
were posted publicly on it.24  At the median, it took about ten
seconds longer for those filings to be available on the SEC’s
public website than through this feed.25  The disparity was
apparently due to the time that it took the SEC to format and
transfer uploaded files from that upload location over to the
public website.26
Given the well-publicized rise in high-speed trading, it
should come as little surprise that some of the premium sub-
scribers were traders who were profiting based on their
seconds-early look at material information found in these dis-
closures.  Those intervals between the time at which the disclo-
sures became available to them and the time at which they
became available to the general public were characterized by
abnormally high trading volume—and sharp price movements
in the direction that the public disclosure would soon indicate
to the market more generally.27
In response, the SEC ironically found itself engaging in an
effort to ensure that the disclosures that it requires firms them-
selves to make available to all investors at the same time were
actually disseminated in that manner when filed “publicly”
with the agency.  Indeed, soon after the academic works sum-
24 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 4; Rogers et al., supra note 23, at R
17.  Forty or so clients subscribed to this feed, each paying about $15,000 annu-
ally for it. See Ryan Tracy & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders Are Getting Data from
SEC Seconds Early, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:18 p.m.), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/fast-traders-are-getting-data-from-sec-seconds-early-1414539997
[https://perma.cc/XG2G-U86Q]; see also Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at R
app. A (showing that they paid approximately $1,500 per month for the service).
25 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22,  at 1, 2, 8 (finding that the median R
early release was 10.3 seconds early); Rogers et al., supra note 23, at 28.  Interest- R
ingly, even after outliers were disregarded, lag times varied greatly.  Some feeds
came a few seconds early, and others well over a minute. See Jackson et al.,
supra note 19, at 19. R
26 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 9.  The SEC itself was also making R
these filings available to investors moments before they were made public.  When
disclosures were uploaded to EDGAR, they were immediately posted to an SEC
file-transfer-protocol server. See id. at 4.  Any tech savvy investor who had access
to that server could access the disclosures on it.  At the median, those documents
were not available on EDGAR’s front-end website until eleven seconds after they
became available on the server. Id. at 8.  However, because the early releases
provided by subscription were accessible in a far more consistent and broader
way than these early releases, we focus on the former.
27 See id. at 13; Rogers et al., supra note 23, at 2 (“[P]rices, volumes, and R
spreads move [in the direction of the news] 15–30 seconds in advance of when the
news is posted to the [public] SEC EDGAR site.”).
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marized here led to a Wall Street Journal article,28 the Commis-
sion appeared to have imposed a delay on the premium-
subscriber feed.  After that article, most filings on the feed went
out only after they were first posted on EDGAR’s front-end
website—meaning that the subscribers received the informa-
tion after it was already in the public domain.29  Thus, the SEC
engaged in an initiative to stop a practice in which public-
company disclosures were being disseminated to high-speed
traders anywhere from a handful of minutes to a few seconds
before they were first made available to the public.
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action
Corporate disclosures are not the only source of material
information that is disclosed to the public.  Each year, an array
of private and public entities likewise generates new informa-
tion that moves markets, and makes it broadly available to the
public.  Some of these entities that produce this valuable infor-
mation—such as securities-analysis firms—specifically gear
their information production toward investors who are looking
to buy underpriced securities and sell overpriced ones.
Others—such as universities, government agencies, and trade
associations—primarily direct their generation of information
toward furthering their own, non-securities-based ends.
No matter what the primary motivation of its creator, there
has traditionally been no bar on the tiered dissemination of this
type of information.  After all, the production of this informa-
tion has considerable benefits (namely, those arising out of
more accurate stock prices)30—and the ability to produce your
own information about at least other entities and profit from
trading on it yourself has long been unquestioned.  Neverthe-
less, last summer, New York State Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman, the most prominent state-level regulator of
Wall Street, put a halt to a practice in which entities were
disseminating this type of information with unequal timing.31
As you might imagine, in a world of high-speed trading,
these types of early-release practices were becoming common-
28 See Scott Patterson, SEC to Close Gap in Filings’ Release, WALL ST. J., Dec.
27–28, 2014, at B1.
29 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 14. R
30 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of stock- R
price accuracy and the social benefits of more accurate stock prices); infra section
I.B.1 (same).
31 See supra Introduction.
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place over the past few years.32  Perhaps thousands of such
informational work products were routinely being released
early to speedy traders.33  More technically, the entities who
were making these disclosures were selling the right to dis-
tribute them to news-related businesses or other information-
dissemination services.  These intermediaries, in turn, would
pass along the information to their clients before it was made
available to the public—including by sending out a computer-
readable early release specifically designed for high-speed trad-
ers.34  Thus, the sale of early-access rights was emerging as a
not-insignificant business for both the entities that created this
information as well as the intermediaries that purchased the
right to disseminate it early.
A salient example of both the information and types of
early-release practices at issue is found in the dissemination of
the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment.35
Since just after World War II, the state university has produced
this index that measures the sentiment of American consum-
ers—assembling the work via nationwide telephone surveys
that inquire into individuals’ views as to the current state of the
economy.36  The end product that results from the surveys is
widely thought to provide key insights into how much Ameri-
can consumers will spend in the near future.  And the amount
32 See, e.g., Brody Mullins, Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty & Jenny Stras-
burg, Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2013, at A1
(“[S]elling early access [to non-governmental, market-moving information] is rou-
tine.”); Michael Rothfeld & Brody Mullins, Peeks Are Still Available for Some Key
Economic Data, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013, 9:19 p.m.), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/SB10001424127887324867904578594110309778332 [https://perma.cc/
3NHN-HF28] (“Many high-speed traders and hedge funds pay nongovernmental
organizations for early access to economic reports and other data that often affect
financial markets . . . .”).
33 See Grace Xing Hu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Early Peek Advantage? 8 (Oct.
6, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361311
[https://perma.cc/4HJM-TFRG] (“Thomson Reuters[‘s] . . . low-latency news feed
product . . . releases more than 1200 economic indicators in formats specially
designed for algorithm trading.”).
34 See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d
141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that Thomson Reuters purchases the right to
distribute information from various non-governmental sources, and that the com-
pany uses those rights to get high-speed feeds of that information in computer-
readable forms to paying customers).
35 Other prominent examples include the information contained in the Chi-
cago Business Barometer (a monthly index that measures economic activity
based on surveys of Chicago-area businesses) and the manufacturing index pro-
duced by the Institute for Supply Management, an index “regarded by many as
the single most important economic report coming from the private sector.” See
Mullins et al., supra note 32. R
36 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 7. R
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that Americans will soon consume of course has serious impli-
cations for the value of thousands upon thousands of securi-
ties.  As such, at around 10:00 a.m. on the second and fourth
Fridays of each month when Michigan publicly releases revi-
sions to its index, securities prices regularly change.37
Although Michigan provided its twice-a-month index revi-
sions via a conference call beginning at 9:55 a.m. and on its
website soon after, these revisions reached many before then.38
The school, like so many other entities that fall far outside the
scope of Reg FD’s public-company coverage, sold the exclusive
right to disseminate its work product early to Thomson
Reuters—garnering approximately $1.4 million in annual reve-
nue in return.39  Thomson Reuters, in turn, used its early-
distribution rights to sell its own feed of the results at 9:55 a.m.
sharp as well as a premium release at exactly 9:54:58 a.m.40
That premium release—going out just two seconds prior to the
index’s broader 9:55 a.m. subscriber-only and conference-call
releases—came in the form of a computer-readable feed that
was specifically designed for high-speed traders.41  Although
anyone who paid the approximately $6,000-per-month sub-
scription fee42 could receive that two-second advantage, the
group of subscribers presumably consisted solely of the only
traders that could obtain a time-based advantage in such a
short period (high-speed ones).
But, Attorney General Schneiderman began putting a halt
to these increasingly common practices in the summer of
2013.43  The prosecutor did not bring formal charges against
37 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he public release of . . . [the Michigan Index of Consumer
Sentiment] can often move financial markets, in ways similar to the release of
official government data such as GDP, inflation and unemployment numbers.”).
38 Id. at 7–8.
39 See Mullins et al., supra note 32. R
40 Id.
41 See id. (“Thomson Reuters’s marketing materials say the firm offers paying
clients an ‘exclusive 2-second advanced feed of results . . . designed specifically for
algorithmic trading.’” (ellipsis in original)); Hu et al., supra note 33, at 7 (“The R
earliest wave of release happens at 9:54:58 a.m. . . . [EST], when Thomson
Reuters sends out . . . [Index of Consumer Sentiment] numbers, in a specialized
machine readable format, to a small group of fee-paying, high-speed clients.”).
42 See Mullins et al., supra note 32 (“Clients who pay a subscription fee to R
Thomson Reuters, which for some is $5,000 a month plus a $1,025 monthly
connection charge, get the high-speed feed at 9:54:58 a.m. Eastern time.”).  To
follow up on the related examples from note 35, the Institute for Supply Manage- R
ment sells early access to its revised manufacturing indices via a high-speed
service in return for about $3,000 per month, and the Chicago Business Barome-
ter sells early access to its measure of local business activity for approximately
$2,600 a year. See id.
43 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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the University of Michigan, Thomson Reuters, or any of the
legions of public and private entities that were providing these
sneak peeks at information that they were making available to
the public.  But the threat of prosecution—perhaps along with
the unwanted publicity of the investigation—was more than
these entities were willing to bear.  To date, the practice in
which this information was being disseminated to a select few
before being made available to the public more generally ap-
pears to have gone the way of the pre-Reg FD selective release
of corporate information—ending altogether since Schneider-
man’s office entered into agreements with information-dissemi-
nation intermediaries in which those businesses agreed to
cease and desist their tiered dissemination practices.44  In
short, those in the information-dissemination business seem to
have little interest in fighting City Hall in the New York State
court system or in countering prosecutorial press releases in a
broader public-relations war.
B. The Policy Rationales Behind the Law
As the name of the main aspect of IDL (Regulation “Fair”
Disclosure) suggests, simultaneity efforts are primarily—al-
though not exclusively—driven by the desire to make securities
markets fairer for ordinary investors.  This section summarizes
this fairness rationale that drives the law in this area.  It also
briefly introduces other important policy rationales behind Reg
FD.
1. Reg FD
When released, the SEC justified Reg FD mainly on fair-
ness grounds.  However, the agency also asserted two addi-
tional justifications.  One of these additional justifications is
closely related to the fairness one, while the other is quite dis-
tinct.  But an understanding of all of these rationales is vital for
understanding simultaneity’s actual impact on ordinary inves-
tors as well as our critique of the current form of IDL.
a. Making Securities Markets Fairer for Ordinary
Investors
First and foremost, the SEC promulgated Reg FD to make
market participation fairer for the everyday individuals who
invest directly or indirectly in the stock market.  When setting
forth the regulation, the agency itself acknowledged that its
44 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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new law was primarily aimed at this end.45  The agency thought
that it was unfair to allow some market participants a head
start in the race to process newly disclosed, material corporate
information.  It therefore thought that the law should help in-
vestors by ensuring that they can trade on a level playing field
with securities professionals when new information is being
disclosed to the public.
b. Boosting Investor Confidence in the Market
Second, and relatedly, the SEC asserted that Reg FD was
attractive because it would improve investor confidence in the
market.  The Commission noted that it had received much sup-
port from individual investors for the simultaneous-dissemina-
tion requirement, and that this support gave rise to the
inference that the requirement would increase their confidence
in the stock market.46  The reasoning of the agency and the
investors who supported action in this area seems to be
straightforward: in a world in which firms can hand out infor-
mation in a tiered manner, some investors (at least individual
investors who transact directly through brokerage accounts)
are at a structural informational disadvantage to some select
group of professional traders.  Knowing that, those investors
would have the perception that participating in the stock mar-
ket involved playing an unfair game.47  They would downgrade
their view of the integrity of the market—meaning that they
would have less confidence in its ability to generate desirable
results for them.  Therefore they might withdraw their invest-
ments or pay less for the investments they were willing to
45 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7787, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Reg FD Propos-
ing Release] (stating that the main goal of Reg FD is to help increase “fundamental
fairness to all investors.”).  The SEC emphasized that “the vast majority of . . .
[those who submitted comment letters in response to the SEC’s Reg FD proposal]
consisted of individual investors,” and that those investors urged the adoption of
the regulation because non-simultaneous dissemination of corporate disclosures
“places them at a severe disadvantage in the market.”  Reg FD Adopting Release,
supra note 15, at 51,717. R
46 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718 (“[T]he overwhelm- R
ing support from investors for Regulation FD demonstrates a strong perception
among the investing public that selective disclosure is a significant problem, and
shows a corresponding need to prohibit this practice in order to bolster investor
confidence in the fairness of the disclosure process.”).
47 See id. at 51,716 (“We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads
to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.  Investors
who see a security’s price change dramatically and only later are given access to
the information responsible for that move rightly question whether they are on a
level playing field with market insiders.”).
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make.  Both of these would lead to undesirable results from a
social welfare perspective.48
c. Enhancing the Quality of the Price-Discovery Process
Third, the Commission argued that this legal reform was
well-reasoned policy for a very distinct reason: it would make
the process in which corporate information is produced and
impounded into stock prices more robust.49  This would lead to
stock prices that better reflect firms’ fundamental values,
which would in turn lead to better capital allocation and corpo-
rate governance.50
The concept of how the simultaneous-dissemination re-
quirement would make this process more robust is perhaps
best understood by thinking about two ways in which that
process is weakened by permitting disclosures to be released
piecemeal.  First, in a world in which such tiered dissemination
of corporate information is allowed, firms could choose which
securities analysts would be the first to obtain the material
information found in their disclosures.  Obvious conflicts of
interest would result, and distortions in the quality of the anal-
ysis of that important information might therefore arise.51  Of
particular concern, these market participants would be afraid
to provide negative analysis of a firm, since any analyst who did
so may quickly find itself losing favor with the firm the next
time it selected the universe of market participants to which it
would provide such valuable early looks.52
Second, in the world in which simultaneity is not required,
some select group of securities analysts and professional trad-
ers has an exclusive on important information.  Knowing this,
most—if not all—outside that group would be foolish to waste
time engaging in the resource-intensive work of procuring, an-
alyzing, and trading on the information in corporate disclo-
sures.  Why engage in the competition to come in first in that
information-based race if some select group of sophisticated
competitors is able to set off before you?  As such, those
48 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. R
49 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718. R
50 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of stock- R
price accuracy as well as the social benefits of more accurate prices).
51 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,717. R
52 See id. at 51,716 (“Regulation FD is also designed to address . . . the
potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity
to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors.”); id. at
51,717 (“[I]n the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel
pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in
order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information.”).
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outside the favored group will cease to compete—leaving only
the selected group in the information-trading market.  With
less competition in that market, the amount and quality of
analysis may suffer—and then the amount and quality of infor-
mation contained in stock prices would too.53
In the end, then, in one or both of these ways, permitting
disclosures to be disseminated in a non-simultaneous fashion,
the SEC asserted, would reduce the quality of the process in
which information about firms’ prospects is produced, ana-
lyzed, and incorporated into stock prices—thereby evoking a
closely related larger concern in the field54 for accurate stock
pricing and the social benefits associated with it.
2. Recent Expansions
Fairness is also the main driving force behind the recent
varied, yet related, efforts geared at ensuring the simultaneous
dissemination of valuable information.
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative
The rationale behind the SEC’s corrective action to stop the
early release of EDGAR filings was predictable.  As lawmakers’
cries indicated, ordinary-investor fairness compelled an end to
the non-simultaneous dissemination of those filings by the
SEC and its contractors.55
According to the SEC, EDGAR’s “primary purpose is to
increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities market for
the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by ac-
celerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and analysis
of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the agency.”56
Moreover, upon learning of the early releases, the top members
of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af-
fairs, promptly wrote the head of the SEC, noting that SEC
“rules have laid the foundations for some of the . . . concerns
about fairness,” and that “the assertions of preferred access to
EDGAR filings via the SEC’s systems . . . give credence to
53 For a discussion of the connection between Reg FD and level of competition
in the securities-analysis market, see generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property Rights in
Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001).
54 See supra note 7. R
55 See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text. R
56 Important Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Feb. 16, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/
V6ZN-533C].
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th[ose] apprehensions.”57  In responding to the senate commit-
tee, the SEC predictably emphasized that it was “working to
help ensure that the equity markets remain the deepest and
fairest in the world.”58
Members of the House of Representatives struck a similar
tone in response to learning of the SEC’s apparently inadver-
tent tiered-dissemination practices.  Representative Carolyn
Maloney, representing both the House Financial Services Com-
mittee and the Upper East Side of Manhattan, posted a press
release entitled Maloney Calls on SEC to End Outrageous Policy
That Allows Inside Investors Early Access to Public Filings.59
That release quotes the congresswoman as saying the follow-
ing: “It is extremely distressing that insiders have been getting
an early look at public filings for so long.”60  The release also
added that this non-simultaneous dissemination of corporate
filings “violates the basic principles of fairness that underpin
our markets,” and “urge[d] the SEC to put a stop to this as soon
as possible.”61
Even University of Chicago economists seemed to question
the fairness, noting in a paper co-authored with a University of
Colorado economist that these early-release practices raise
questions about whether the SEC dissemination process is re-
ally a level playing field for all investors.62
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action
The Attorney General likewise primarily cited ordinary-in-
vestor fairness concerns in putting the kibosh on practices in
which high-speed traders were receiving seconds-early access
to market-moving information.  In announcing his office’s
agreement with Thomson Reuters, Attorney General Eric
Schneiderman stated that a “two second advantage is more
than enough time for . . . [high-frequency] traders to take unfair
advantage of their early access to this information.”63  That
same announcement added that “[p]romoting fairness and
57 Letter from Senators Tim Johnson and Mike Crapo to SEC Chair Mary Jo
White (Dec. 8, 2014) (on file with authors).
58 Letter from SEC Chair Mary Jo White to Senators Johnson and Crapo (Dec.
23, 2014) (on file with the authors).
59 Maloney Calls on SEC to End Outrageous Policy that Allows Inside Investors
Early Access to Public Filings, CAROLYN B. MALONEY (Oct. 28, 2014), https://malon
ey.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-calls-on-sec-to-end-outrage
ous-policy-that-allows-inside [https://perma.cc/U8NB-PN6A].
60 Id.
61 See id.
62 See Rogers et al., supra note 23, at 4. R
63 See Schneiderman Agrees, supra note 2. R
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avoiding distortions in the securities markets is an important
focus of this office” and that “the early release of market-mov-
ing survey data undermines fair play in the markets.”64  Moreo-
ver, the announcement added that the agreement “sends a
message that unfair timing advantages for high-frequency trad-
ers and others will not be tolerated by the Attorney General.”65
* * *
This initial Part has provided an overview of the defining
feature of a growing area of regulation that we have termed
“information-dissemination law:” requirements that market-
moving information be revealed to the market simultaneously.
Although not its only end, primarily in the name of fairness, the
main example of IDL (Reg FD) requires the information that sits
at the center of modern securities regulation (material corpo-
rate information) to be made available to all members of the
public at the same exact time when it is first disseminated
beyond the firm.  And the related efforts discussed here like-
wise call for the equally timed dissemination of a wide variety of
other valuable information in furtherance of that same end
alone.
II
A MODEL OF KEY ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET
In this Part, we set forth a well-established model of key
aspects of the American stock market.  Focusing on distinct
types of traders in the stock market as well as the information
asymmetries between them that results in ordinary investors
incurring costs, that model provides the background necessary
to understand both our critique of IDL’s simultaneous-dissemi-
nation requirement in Part III as well as our contemplated re-
forms to IDL in Part IV.  More specifically, the model describes
the distinct characteristics of information traders, portfolio
traders, noise traders, and professional-liquidity-providing
traders—and presents one clear indication of the well-estab-
lished asymmetric-information costs (AI costs) that ordinary
investors incur as result of interactions between, on the one
hand, information traders and, on the other, professional li-
quidity providers and portfolio traders.66
64 Id.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66 Here and throughout much of the paper, we predominantly focus on the
parties that are buying and selling stock (traders) rather than on the often distinct
ultimate beneficiaries of their trading (investors).  We do so because IDL’s effects
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A. Four Main Types of Traders67
All individuals and entities buying and selling stocks are in
search of financial gain.  Yet one can nevertheless break down
these market participants into the four groups introduced
above based on the unique types of financial motivations and
strategies that animate their trading.
1. Information Traders
Information traders generally purchase and sell stocks
based on information as to companies’ fundamental values
that is not yet reflected in market prices.68  Competing as an
information trader today requires exceedingly high levels of ex-
pertise and technological prowess.  Sources of market-moving
information, such as corporate disclosures, are often complex.
Analyzing their import in the context of vast and ever changing
firm-specific and market-wide information is even more com-
plex.  And beyond these analytical challenges lies what is
sometimes the most complex part: capturing trading profits
based on information that often depreciates at incredible
speeds.69  Thus, to compete in this game, one must have con-
siderable resources, including access to first-rate analysis and
state-of-the-art trade-execution systems.
The challenge relating to execution speed calls for empha-
sis.  Today, the value of some types of market-moving informa-
tion—such as that found in at least data-based public news
announcements—often loses its value in literally less than the
blink of an eye.70  It is for this reason that information traders
fall on the former in the first instance.  For example, we focus on information
traders (e.g., hedge funds) that are buying and selling stock based on information
rather than on the investors (e.g., wealthy individuals) whose money those traders
are investing, or on portfolio traders (e.g., index-based mutual funds) rather than
the investors (e.g., retirement savers) whose money those traders are investing.
67 Our four-type model of traders is based on common models found in works
in the area of market-microstructure economics. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 5 R
(providing a model along these lines, albeit with additional detail and sub-
categories unnecessary for present purposes).  Models similar to the one we
present here have also appeared in the legal literature. See Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note 53; Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the R
Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121 (2015).
68 But see infra note 73 (providing a brief overview of the main exception to R
this general statement: information traders that profitably buy and sell based on
short-term market movements that do not reflect the actual consensus import of
fundamental-value information).
69 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text. R
70 See, e.g., Hu et al., supra note 33, at 3–4 (finding that the new information R
contained in a key economic indicator (the Michigan consumer-sentiment survey
discussed earlier) became incorporated into securities prices within 200 millisec-
onds of its release).  An eye blink lasts about 100–400 milliseconds. See Daniel
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spend enormous sums not only on obtaining and processing
information, but also on executing trades at ever shortening
latencies.71  Indeed, even when information-dissemination
practices such as the seconds-early ones targeted by New
York’s Attorney General and the SEC are eliminated, the infor-
mation is still released by the Bloombergs and Thomson
Reuters of the world in computer-readable form to those who
pay for it—albeit at the same exact time as the information is
made available in more general formats to all.72  Taken to-
gether, these facts dictate that one particular type of informa-
tion trader will often be the one that captures the trading value
of newly released data: the infamous high-speed trader.
Given these attributes, it should come as little surprise
that information trading is generally the realm of institutions.
But not all information traders operate in the same exact way.
Members of one group—such as the news-based, high-
speed traders—buy and sell stocks solely based on their ability
to procure, process, and trade on new computer-readable in-
formation.73  From receipt of the information to completed
trade takes only milliseconds.74  As one might imagine, their
analysis of new information for the most part takes place before
they receive it.  They use carefully designed algorithms to buy
and sell based on one of many expected new data points, wait-
ing only for the information to be inputted into their algo-
rithms.75  There are rumored to be perhaps a dozen or two of
these firms that dominate this type of high-speed trading.
Ramot, BioNumber Details Page, BIONUMBERS (June 11, 2013, 6:35 a.m.), http://
bionumbers.hms.harvard.edu/bionumber.aspx?s=Y&id=100706&ver=0 [https:/
/perma.cc/JG5S-2KAZ].
71 See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency Trading
Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130 Q.J. ECON.
1547, 1549 (2015); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT
(2014) (focusing on an effort to reduce the length of underground cables between
trading centers in New York and Chicago in order to gain microsecond-level trad-
ing advantages).
72 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. R
73 See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed
Trading and Its Regulation 32–33 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
authors) (describing these types of traders, and labeling them “announcement
traders”).
74 See supra note 70. R
75 Somewhat amusingly, these pre-programed algorithms misfire from time to
time. See, e.g., Jamila Trindle, Hacked Tweet Prods Revamp, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30,
2013, 3:27 p.m.), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732448250
4578455114002114382 (noting that markets dropped by considerable amounts
in an instant when the Associated Press’s hacked Twitter feed reported the words
“White House,” “President Barack Obama,” and “explosions” in the same sen-
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Those in another group—thousands of private equity
funds, activist hedge funds, and actively managed mutual
funds—rely on the actual human processing of news.76  Their
trading arises out of their own research or that of any one or
more of thousands of firms from which they purchase “buy
side” securities analysis.  Importantly, in contrast to the work
of news-based, high-speed traders, the scrutiny of firms’ stock
prices performed by these information traders is likely vital to
ensuring stock-price accuracy.  While the former group’s work
merely gets information into stock prices milliseconds before it
would otherwise find its way into those prices, the latter
group’s work often does something very different: it gets more
and better information into stock prices after post-information-
release analysis that occurs not within milliseconds, but in-
stead over the course of minutes, hours, days, or even weeks.
Still, it is worth noting that once that study is complete, the
trading that occurs in light of it increasingly happens only
through sophisticated algorithmic trade-execution programs.77
The last important point to note is that whatever their sub-
type, information traders move in and out of stock positions
frequently and quickly.  Some do so more and faster than
others.  On one end of the spectrum, high-speed traders buy
and sell out of positions in large volumes based on the informa-
tion in new announcements in well under the time needed for
the blink of an eye.  On the other end of that spectrum, invest-
ment funds commonly hold stocks based on their fundamen-
tal-value analysis for sustained periods more easily
measureable in years than milliseconds, seconds, hours, or
even days.  However, even these longer-term information trad-
ers face pressure from the firm-specific risk associated with
loading up on a long or short position in one or more compa-
nies based on information, and therefore generally trade in and
out of those positions far more frequently than the next type of
trader in this market model: the portfolio trader.
tence—even though the network news correspondents on the White House lawn
had nothing unusual to report).
76 Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg refer to these information traders as “funda-
mental value traders.”  Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 73, at 31 n.61. R
77 Information traders and other institutional buyers and sellers routinely
pay for services to execute their large trading needs in a manner that has the least
possible impact on market prices.  For example, Goldman Sachs Execution Ser-
vices works with investment funds to achieve that end.  A number of businesses
that are widely known in industry circles, such as that run by the Investment
Technology Group, also provide these services.
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2. Portfolio Traders
Portfolio traders transact to accumulate, maintain, and liq-
uidate diversified portfolios of stocks.  Some portfolio traders
are individual, ordinary, long-term investors who put together
a wide-ranging basket of stocks through retail-level online bro-
kerage accounts, such as those offered by the Charles
Schwabs, Vanguards, Fidelities, and TIAA-CREFs of the world.
These investors thus engage in portfolio trading directly.  But
most portfolio trading is attributable to relatively low-cost in-
termediaries, such as index-based mutual funds78 operated by
those same securities businesses, or pension funds79 operated
by companies, government agencies, or, increasingly, labor un-
ions.  The ordinary investors who participate in the market
through these intermediaries thus engage in portfolio trading
only in an indirect fashion.
Portfolio traders seek monetary gain over long-run periods
by using surplus savings to create wealth for their future use.
But unlike information trading, portfolio trading does not focus
on newly released information about firms’ prospects.  Infor-
mation about individual firms has no direct—or even proxi-
mately indirect—relevance to the enterprise.  Instead, portfolio
traders invest as a matter of routine.  For instance, individuals
contribute to retirement accounts through payroll deductions
twice a month.  Similarly, institutional portfolio traders buy
and sell to rebalance their portfolios or meet redemption or
subscription demands from those retirement savers and the
like based on their savings and consumption patterns.  In the
end, portfolio traders participate in the market to earn the
market-wide risk premium that is available to those who pro-
vide their capital to public companies in return for the expected
78 We used actively managed mutual funds above to illustrate information
trading.  However, when these funds trade to assemble and maintain diversified
indexes of stocks rather than to beat the market based on fundamental-value
analysis, they are engaging in portfolio trading.  There is reason to believe that a
large portion—if not the majority altogether—of these intermediaries’ trading is
actually associated with portfolio trading. See Jonathan Lewellen, Institutional
Investors and the Limits of Arbitrage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 77 (2011).  After all,
even when they conduct their stock picking, they still hold, on average, 85% or so
of their portfolio in a simple diversified index.
79 Here, we include only the trading that pension funds conduct directly in
order to assemble and maintain a diversified portfolio of stocks.  We do not in-
clude the information trading that they conduct in their own accounts based on
information, or when they allocate funds to private equity funds, hedge funds,
and actively managed mutual funds to do the same on their behalf.
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payouts associated with ownership of those equity
instruments.80
Three final points about portfolio traders bear brief men-
tion—all three of which are crucial to our ultimate conclusions.
First, in contrast to information traders, portfolio traders
place a relatively low value on execution speed and timing.  By
definition, they are not transacting based on quickly depreciat-
ing information about firms’ prospects relative to current mar-
ket prices.  Rather, they are simply trying to assemble and
maintain a portfolio that tracks some large part of the market.
Or to liquidate it in light of consumption needs.  So, before their
transactions take place, as far as they know, stock prices dur-
ing that next interval of time have a more or less 50-50 chance
of increasing or decreasing.81  So, ex ante, whether their orders
to buy and sell pieces of their portfolios are executed in a frac-
tion of a millisecond, a second, a minute, an hour, or even
perhaps several days is largely irrelevant to them.
Second, the number of portfolio traders is enormous, and
their trading dominates the stock market during normal times.
Approximately 50% of all Americans invest in the stock mar-
ket.82  And countless international investors do the same.  And
as some of these many individuals—directly or indirectly—buy
stock to accumulate pieces of their portfolio each day, and
others sell to liquidate pieces of their portfolios in the same
period (and still others trade to rebalance their diversified port-
folios in that period), the ratio of portfolio trades to informed
trades becomes quite high during normal times.  In fact, finan-
cial economists have asserted that the percentage of informed
trading in the market in such times falls merely in the range of
80 As Modern Portfolio Theory teaches, investors can reduce the riskiness
associated with uncertain future cash flows by holding a diverse portfolio of
stocks.  Holding such a basket of stocks effectively eliminates firm-specific risk,
leaving stock owners exposed to only market-wide risk.  All else equal, those who
face lower levels of risk as a result of holding rights to varying future cash flows
will place a higher value on any individual stock than those who face higher levels
of risk associated with those holdings—dictating that investors with diversified
portfolios will own a large portion of public equity and earn whatever premium is
available to those who take on market-wide risk.
81 The idea is simply that stock prices follow a random walk after all new
information has been fully incorporated into them.  For one of the seminal works
on this concept, see generally Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market
Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965) (offering one of the seminal descriptions of this
concept).
82 Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own
Stocks, GALLUP (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/little-
change-percentage-americans-invested-market.aspx [https://perma.cc/QT5G-
AUPH].
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5% or so—with portfolio trading making up the majority of all
other trading.83
Lastly, the story of the average portfolio trader is, far more
often than not, a happy one.  The average investor who held a
portfolio of stocks that indexed the American stock market over
sustained periods throughout the course of the twentieth cen-
tury did quite well.  According to the most famous study of
long-term investment returns in modern markets, these diver-
sified investors earned, on average, a 6.5% post-inflation re-
turn per year.84  And those who invested in indexes of the
sixteen largest domestic stock markets in the world over the
same period earned similar market-wide risk premiums.85  So,
whether or not they have a nuanced familiarity with these fi-
nancial-economic principles and the empirical literature in the
area, ordinary investors who assemble portfolios of stock are
no fools—unlike the third type of trader in this model.
3. Noise Traders
Noise traders are a hybrid of information traders and port-
folio traders: they look like the latter, but behave like the for-
mer.  Like information traders, noise traders seek to use new
information in order to purchase underpriced stocks or sell
overpriced ones.  However, they trade based on information
that does not actually indicate such a mispricing—usually be-
cause the information on which they are buying or selling has
already been impounded into market prices by the time they
have finished watching Power Lunch on CNBC.  Thus, these
market participants operate on the false premise that they pos-
sess a profitable informational advantage.
An example helps illustrate how these traders operate and
why they generally lose.  Suppose that Bud starts a hedge fund
called Fox Investments LP.  Suppose too that he watches cable
news one Friday morning in his office while logged onto his
firm’s e*Trade account.  Then he waits for the news to an-
nounce expected revisions to the University of Michigan’s Index
of Consumer Sentiment at 9:55 a.m.  The broadcast shares the
Michigan announcement, and it’s good news: the index has
83 See Hadiye Aslan, David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O’Hara, The
Characteristics of Informed Trading: Implications for Asset Pricing, 18 J. EMPIRICAL
FIN. 782 (2011); David Easley, Robert F. Engle, Maureen O’Hara & Liuren Wu,
Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades, 6 J. FIN.
ECONOMETRICS 171 (2008).
84 See ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS:
101 YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 42 (2002).
85 See id.
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gone up.  This upward revision is interpreted as an indication
that American consumers feel better about the state of the
economy, and that they are therefore likely to buy more goods
and services from publicly traded companies.  Immediately af-
ter seeing the good news, Bud presses his trigger finger on his
keyboard, submitting an order to purchase some exchange-
traded funds that track the entire domestic market.  By the
time the order is transacted, however, those ETFs are no longer
underpriced.  The Michigan results would have to travel from
Michigan or its agents to the news station to be broadcast, and
then that broadcast would still have to make its way up to a
satellite, and down to Fox’s office—all before the fund’s buy
order travels from its computer, along fiber-optic cables to its
brokerage’s servers, which would then likely route the orders to
one of many trading centers for execution.  This process would
take at least several seconds, which is an eternity in the con-
temporary stock market.  Recent research shows that in this
particular example, after the release of the Michigan data, it is
likely that market prices incorporate the news in just 200 milli-
seconds86—that is, long before Bud has even heard the news.
So, Fox Investments has simply purchased a stock index at its
new, more accurate price.  It is paying what it is worth, but net
of trading fees, it isn’t making a profit on the stale information
it is using to animate the trade.
Critically, the individuals who engage in portfolio trading
through retail brokerage accounts and many of the ten-thou-
sand-plus investment funds that operate in the United States87
sit precariously close to the line that divides them from noise
traders.  And noise traders do not simply buy and sell securi-
ties at market prices that reflect the most recent information
available.  Instead, they act as a mob.  Until better-informed
traders correct it, this mob action causes market prices to go
up (based on mob buying) or down (based on mob selling) be-
yond what the new information at issue called for.  This means
that noise traders often buy at prices that are actually higher
than the price dictated by the new information, and sell at
prices that are actually lower than that price.  It follows that,
more often than not, their trading earns them losses as traders
86 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. R
87 There are estimated to be over 11,000 hedge funds alone. See Lawrence
Delevingne, Hedge Fund Industry Snapshot: $2.6 Trillion in 11,000 Funds, CNBC
(Aug. 31, 2014, 9:00 a.m.), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/industry-snap
shot-26-trillion-in-11000-funds.html [https://perma.cc/JF6M-UGCE].
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with better abilities to digest all available information silence
the noise.88
4. Professional-Liquidity-Providing Traders
The final type of trader in this market model is the profes-
sional-liquidity-providing one. Professional liquidity providers
buy and sell not for their own directional investment account,
but rather as counterparties who stand ready, willing, and able
to transact with other traders at firm bid and ask price quotes.
These professionals allow information traders, portfolio trad-
ers, and noise traders to transact stock immediately with cer-
tainty against those quotes.  They focus not on understanding
the fundamental value of the instruments they trade,89 but
rather on creating a two-sided market that allows them to buy
stock from some traders at bid prices that are below the ask
prices for which they sell the stock to other traders.90  When
there is lots of buying against their ask prices, they move both
their bid and ask prices up around what the market appears to
think the new value of the stock is.  When there is a good deal
of selling against their bid prices, they do the opposite.  Profes-
sional liquidity providers are thus nothing more than the con-
temporary, broader version of traditional market makers—and,
like portfolio traders, are market participants that buy and sell
based on extra-informational reasons.
In the old days—that is, about a decade and a half ago—
individuals on the floor of stock exchanges, known as “special-
ists,” provided this function for individual stocks.  There was a
specialist for IBM and P&G and every other high-volume public
stock, and he stood there ready, willing, and able to buy from
anyone who wanted to sell, and ready, willing, and able to sell
to anyone who wanted to buy.  And in the markets that existed
away from the floor of these exchanges, securities dealers pro-
88 Some traders might be able to consistently predict this type of noise trad-
ing and its short-run effects on market prices.  They may therefore, for example,
buy along with noise traders as the noise traders place upward pressure on prices
through their mass buying, and then sell before market prices are corrected.  To
the extent that traders do this, they are information traders and not noise traders.
But the information on which they trade is not socially valuable fundamental-
value information that makes prices better predictors of the future cash flows
firms will produce.  Rather, it is simply order-flow and intra-market price-move-
ment information that might erode price-accuracy.
89 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 277 (“[Liquidity providers] tend to . . . not know R
much about . . . the fundamental values of the instruments that they trade.”).
90 See, e.g., id. at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try to discover the prices
that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”).
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vided this liquidity.  Today, high-frequency traders have re-
placed these more traditional market markers.91
A further level of detail is important for what follows.  Pro-
fessional liquidity providers’ ask prices are, as a general mat-
ter, above the market’s current assessment of a stock’s
fundamental value, and their bid prices are below that market
value—with each spread out equidistantly from it.92  It is this
spacing out of bid and ask prices around current values that
allows professional liquidity providers to earn their “bid-ask
spread.”  And by placing their bid quotes and ask quotes equi-
distantly—yet not too far—away from stocks’ current market
values, they can better attract the even two-sided flow of trader
buy and sell orders that they seek.
Because professional liquidity providers transact at this
bid-ask spread, there is generally a difference between, on the
one hand, the prices at which market participants can
purchase and sell stocks quickly and, on the other, the mar-
ket’s valuation of those stocks.  This delta dictates that a trader
seeking to buy a stock from a liquidity provider will generally
pay more than the stock’s market value to procure it, and that
a trader who wants to sell a stock to a liquidity provider will for
the most part receive less than that value in return for it.
Critically, the size of this delta between the market’s as-
sessment of a stock’s fundamental value and liquidity provid-
ers’ ask and bid prices determines the quality of the price
received by investors who want to trade on demand.  Bid and
ask prices that are closer to that market assessment result in
better-quality prices for those who seek to transact on demand.
And conversely, bid and ask prices that are farther away from
that market valuation lead to worse-quality ones for those
investors.93
91 See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Tradings and Its Impact on
Market Quality 2 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://secure.fia.org/ptg-
downloads/hft_trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/BPY4-W97Q] (using a NASDAQ
data set to show that high-frequency traders supply liquidity for over half of all
trades); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New
Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712, 714 (2013) (describing the rise of the high-
frequency trader).
92 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 287–88 (“[Liquidity providers] . . . set their bid R
prices just below fundamental values and their ask prices just above . . . .”).
93 The quality of these prices is determined by much more than simply the
spread between the best (highest) bid prices and the best (lowest) ask prices in the
market.  Liquidity providers post only a limited number of shares at those prices.
They then post limited numbers of shares at a series of successively inferior bid
prices and ask prices.  So, the quality of the prices received by traders who
transact on demand in this fashion generally depends on the quality of a mix of
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An example helps make these important mechanical points
easier to internalize.  Assume the market currently values a
stock at $10.50 per share.  If liquidity providers were transact-
ing traders’ sell orders for the stock at bid prices of $10.48 per
share, then those traders could sell the stock to the liquidity
providers by accepting the $10.48 price.  If the liquidity provid-
ers were also executing other traders’ buy orders for the stock
at ask prices of $10.52 per share, then those traders could
procure it by paying the $10.52 price.  As such, when a liquid-
ity provider buys the stock at its best (highest) bid price of
$10.48 per share from a trader’s sell order, and then turns
around and sells those shares to another trader at its best
(lowest) ask price of $10.52 per share, it would earn $0.04 per
each share bought and then sold.  And from the perspective of
other traders, there would thus be a $0.02 spread cost associ-
ated with either buying from, or selling to, these liquidity prov-
iders—as buyers must pay $10.52 for a stock worth $10.50,
and sellers only receive $10.48 for the same.  If the liquidity
providers were instead posting best (highest) bid prices of
$10.00 and best (lowest) ask prices of $11.00 around that same
$10.50 market value, traders seeking to transact on demand
against them would be receiving markedly inferior prices.
What determines the quality of these liquidity-provider
prices?  As we discuss in the next section, the most important
determinant of the quality of liquidity-provider prices in the
market is generally information asymmetry.94
quoted prices and the number of shares available at them—and not simply on the
prices associated with the best bids and asks.
94 Although professional liquidity providers make a business out of posting
bid and ask quotes and earning their spreads, all other traders also can attempt
to complete some of their trading by posting quotes against which other market
participants can transact.  That is, information, portfolio, and noise traders may
try to achieve their buying needs not by transacting against liquidity providers’
ask prices on demand, but instead by posting bids of their own—or complete their
selling not by executing against liquidity providers’ bid prices right away, but
instead by quoting asks of their own.  Today, at least on the registered exchanges
where most trading takes place, any market participant can freely attempt to
accomplish its trading needs via providing liquidity to other traders in this man-
ner.  Each registered exchange must allow brokers or dealers to become members
of its exchange. See Securities and Exchange Act § 6(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2)
(2012).  And all exchanges must post bid and ask quotes submitted by their
members. See Regulation National Market System Rule 604, 17 C.F.R. § 242.604
(2016).  When traders sit back and patiently buy and sell by waiting for other
market participants to transact against their bid and ask quotes, respectively, in
this way, they are said to “make” liquidity for the market.  (In contrast, when they
transact against other liquidity providers’ quotes, they are said to “take”
liquidity.).
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B. Information Asymmetries and the Main Costs It
Imposes
Talk of the concern for the harm that the ordinary, long-
term investors incur at the hands of sophisticated pros who
have better information is common.95  It would be unfair in
many circumstances, the thinking goes, if these individuals
who invest directly through retail-level brokerage accounts or
indirectly through portfolio-trading investment funds suffered
losses as a result of investing in a market in which better-
informed traders lurk.  These information asymmetries and the
“information-asymmetry costs” (IA costs) to which they give rise
are the main costs about which regulators are concerned when
they attempt to improve ordinary-investor fairness.96  Given
the centrality of the concern for these asymmetries and related
costs to IDL today and the nature of our critique of its present
form in Parts III and IV below, this section transitions to that
original analysis by describing the most apparent way in which
IA costs are observed in the market.
The clearest indication of the IA costs that portfolio traders
incur is found in the quality of liquidity-provider pricing in the
market.  When professional liquidity providers hold out their
firm quotes to the market, they make themselves vulnerable to
traders who have better information on the true value of
stocks.  Professional liquidity providers thus often find them-
selves on the other side of trades with better-informed traders.
This vulnerability makes sense.  Professional liquidity provid-
ers are specialized market participants that learn the news
through the flow of orders sent their way rather than based on
their own analysis of new fundamental-value information
before it becomes reflected in market prices.97  Once again,
their focus is instead on setting bid and ask prices that will
produce an even two-sided flow of incoming buy and sell or-
ders, thereby allowing them to earn a bid-ask spread from a
long line of liquidity-demanding portfolio traders.98  Focusing
on things like the ratio of buy and sell orders that come their
way rather than on things like the import of new corporate
earnings’ announcements, professional liquidity providers fre-
quently find themselves at an informational disadvantage when
95 See supra subsection I.A.2.a.
96 See supra Introduction.
97 See supra section II.A.4.
98 See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. R
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they supply their services to information traders—and there-
fore sustain trading losses to them.99
All else being equal, when professional liquidity providers
expect to incur larger losses at the hands of better-informed
traders in any given time period, they quote inferior prices to
the market.100  By quoting bid prices that are further south
from a stock’s current value, and ask prices further north from
that same value, they better deter information traders from
trading opposite them by reducing their trading profits.101
Thus, professional liquidity providers will quote worse prices
(i.e., prices further away from current market values) when
they expect a higher chance of transacting opposite better-
informed traders.102
This conclusion has special import for more than just pro-
fessional liquidity providers.  Of significance here, it means
that portfolio traders—and therefore ordinary investors—will
99 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the side of the R
market on which they trade, and the . . . [professional liquidity providers] end up
losing money to them.”).  For a more detailed explanation in the legal literature of
exactly how information traders impose losses on professional liquidity providers,
see Haeberle, supra note 67. R
100 For the seminal work modeling this information asymmetry and the ad-
verse-selection issues associated with it, see HARRIS, supra note 5, at 6, 298; R
Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 75
(1985).
101 Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 100.  Quoting inferior prices also helps R
liquidity providers in a second way: by increasing the amount of their take from
each “roundtrip transaction,” in industry parlance, in which they are able to buy
at their bid and turn around and sell at their ask opposite portfolio traders whose
trading—unlike that of information traders—generally does not move prices.  This
helps them make up their losses through a steady spread with bid (buy) transac-
tions at prices that are in fact lower than ask (sell) transactions.  For the original
work modeling the main way in which these liquidity providers offset their losses
to information traders by transacting with “uninformed” investors, see Albert S.
Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985). See
also HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299. R
102 In today’s market, the average spread between the best (highest) bid price
for a stock and the best (lowest) ask price is quite small.  For thickly traded large-
capitalization stocks, the size of this spread is usually in the one-cent range and
for thinly traded small-capitalization stock, that spread is typically in the nine-
cent range. See, e.g., CFA INSTITUTE, DARK POOLS, INTERNALIZATION, AND EQUITY MAR-
KET QUALITY 5 (2012), http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2012.n5.1.
However, even stocks with average spreads of a mere penny will have periods in
which their spreads are far larger.  And liquidity providers only quote limited
quantities at their best prices, and then post limited quantities at a series of
successively inferior ones. See supra note 93.  Thus, a liquidity provider may R
protect itself in the way mentioned in the text by quoting inferior prices in two
ways: by increasing the size of the spread between its best bid and ask prices for a
period of time or by thinning out its offerings both its best bids and asks as well as
all successively inferior bids and asks, or both.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-6\CRN601.txt unknown Seq: 38 19-SEP-16 16:03
1410 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1373
face inferior prices when transacting against liquidity-provider
quotes during periods of high information asymmetry in the
market.  Simply put, when information traders have knowledge
of information that is not yet incorporated into market prices,
liquidity providers—perceiving an asymmetry in information
know by them versus that known by information traders based
on the one-side buy (or sell) orders they are receiving—will
protect themselves by quoting inferior prices until the informa-
tion asymmetry is resolved.103  And during those periods, port-
folio traders—and consequently ordinary investors—will face
inferior prices.  Whether or not articulated in this fine-tuned
way, it is mainly these IA costs that drive the concern for the
harm that ordinary, long-term investors incur as a result of
participating in a market in which better-informed traders
lurk.  And it is these IA costs embodied in price quotes of infer-
ior quality that we use next to show previously unidentified
effects of IDL on ordinary-investor wellbeing.104
* * *
As this basic model of key aspects of the American stock
market illustrates, four entirely different types of traders in-
habit the market.  While each of them is after financial gain,
their very different motivations and strategies lead to them in-
teracting in complex ways.  Of paramount significance, infor-
mation traders profit by discovering and bringing new
information to the market.  But to gain from speculating on this
information, these traders must necessarily impose losses on
some other traders.  In this Part, we have shown how they do
so—focusing on the direct losses they impose on professional
market makers, the inferior-quote response by those profes-
sionals, and the resulting higher IA costs incurred by ordinary
investors.
In the next Part, we build on this model to do what the
securities regulators have apparently failed to do: attempt to
103 See supra section II.A.4.  Notably, these inferior prices are often material
even when traders are buying and selling large-capitalization stocks that on aver-
age have a $0.01 spread between the best bid and ask prices available in the
market.  Once again, the size of those average spreads fluctuates throughout the
trading day, and at least large traders are concerned with both that size and the
fact that they will often have to transact against limited numbers of shares at both
those best prices as well as at a series of successively inferior bid and ask prices.
See supra note 102. R
104 For a deeper look at the way in which portfolio traders incur IA costs, see
Kevin S. Haeberle, Welcoming Information Asymmetry (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the authors).
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see the true effects of the equal-timing requirements at the
heart of IDL today on these IA costs.  We thus explain how this
growing and under-theorized area of the law actually affects
the wellbeing of not only an important group of market partici-
pants who policymakers have long sought to protect as a gen-
eral matter, but also the very group of investors who are alleged
to be the principal beneficiaries of that area of law.
III
THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF IDL ON ORDINARY INVESTORS’ WELLBEING
In this Part we show how the simultaneous-dissemination
requirements that define IDL today actually affect ordinary in-
vestors.  We do so by first looking at how they affect informa-
tion asymmetries in the market generally, and then by
examining the impact of those effects on specific groups of
everyday investors.  In the end, we conclude that Reg FD has
an ambiguous impact on the welfare of ordinary investors on
the whole.  We also explain some promise onto which it appears
to have stumbled.  But at the same time, we discuss why there
is strong reason to believe that the regulation is perversely
making things worse for the ordinary investors who stand in
the most precarious position in the market (those who trade
directly through brokerage accounts rather than indirectly
through funds).  We also theorize that the NYAG initiative from
the past few years that has stopped seconds-early access to
market-moving information leaves ordinary investors worse off
than they would be without it.  And we briefly touch on why the
SEC’s 2014–2015 EDGAR initiative has an impact that falls
somewhere between that of Reg FD and the NYAG’s action—
although closer to the latter.  Thus, in this Part, we analyze the
extent to which the current form of each of these examples of
IDL furthers its primary stated ends.
A. Effects on Information Asymmetries in the Market
Generally
To see how Reg FD and the related recent efforts affect the
wellbeing of ordinary investors in general, one must think
about the nature of information asymmetries in the market
after new information is released in two worlds.  The first world
is the one in which we live today.  The second is a hypothetical
parallel one in which information producers are freely permit-
ted to reveal their information in a tiered manner before shar-
ing it more widely.
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1. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods
When Simultaneity is Required
Simultaneous-dissemination requirements have important
effects on the trading environment in the tens of thousands of
periods105 throughout the year that occur after market-moving
information is first released beyond those who are barred from
trading on it.
When new information is first released to all potential in-
vestors at the same exact time in compliance with the law
today, information traders immediately procure, process, and
trade on it.  All the while, at least those who specialize in some-
thing other than such speculative trading remain in the dark
on at least the import of the new information for some period—
even if they have the right to access it equally.  In many cases,
the informational disadvantage will be attributable to a lack of
access to hyper-fast information-dissemination and trade-exe-
cution systems.  In others, the issue will generally boil down to
a lack of interest in the new information.106  Thus, when public
companies and other important information producers initially
release information today, there is a period characterized by an
asymmetry in information known by sophisticated informa-
tion-trading pros and that known by almost all other market
participants.
Crucially, though, this post-release period of heightened
information asymmetry before business as usual picks up
again must be both acute and short-lived.  Thanks to equal-
timing requirements, any trader can access corporate disclo-
sures and the like as soon as they are released.  It follows that
those who aim to profit by trading based on at least relatively
clear inferences from the released information must procure it,
analyze it, and execute on it immediately—lest the competition
beats them to the punch.  In fact, in today’s high-speed, elec-
tronic stock market, the value of at least computer-readable
105 See, e.g., Jackson et al., supra note 19, at 9 (showing that over 40,000 R
filings by public companies were made during one 16-week period in 2014).  Al-
though so many public-firm disclosure filings are made each year, only some
subset of them contains market-moving information.  And, only a subset of those
disclosures is released during the trading day.  Whatever the exact number of
important disclosures released during normal trading hours, two things are clear:
the 5,000 or so United States public firms combine to make a very large number of
disclosures that move market prices, and other entities that sit far outside the
scope of mandatory-disclosure law also release a large number of similar informa-
tional products.
106 See supra subpart II.A (comparing information traders’ focus on new mar-
ket-moving information to the extra-informational bases on which portfolio trad-
ers and professional liquidity providers trade).
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information with import for market prices that can be evalu-
ated with consensus valuation models is thought to disappear
altogether within well under a second of its public release.
Both recent empirical study and industry practice evidence
this conclusion.  With regard to the former, financial econo-
mists studied the trading environment associated with the re-
lease of the data found in the University of Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment.  They found that, when it was known
that this relatively easy-to-interpret information would be
made available to the entire public shortly, the information
routinely became incorporated into market prices with a flurry
of trading activity within just 200 milliseconds of its release to a
dozen or so information traders.107  With regard to the latter,
the information asymmetries are so powerful during post-re-
lease periods today that professional liquidity providers are
known to cease to supply their services altogether when they
expect or begin to detect the trading associated with the release
of new information.108  By taking the exceptional step of remov-
ing themselves altogether from the market during these brief
bursts of information asymmetry, they broadly protect them-
selves from incurring losses to better-informed traders around
the time at which they occur.109
Of course, evaluating the true import of other harder-to-
digest information may instead take much longer.  But in a
world with the current equal-timing mandates, information
traders have little time to waste when it comes to the fast and
furious race to profit based on even that type of newly shared
information.  They can either analyze the new information and
trade on it as quickly as the competition, or sit this particular
game out altogether.
Ultimately, then, under current IDL, a large amount of in-
formation asymmetry is often condensed into a small period of
time lasting as little as well under a second that ensues after
new information is made available to all investors.
107 Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; see supra notes 32–35 and accompany- R
ing text.
108 On a panel at a securities-law conference at Columbia Law School with one
of us in November of 2014, the CEO of one of the largest liquidity providers in the
market today acknowledged this common response to the public release of new
information.  Douglas Cifu, CEO, Virtu Financial LLC, Remarks at Columbia Law
School conference on “Current Issues in Securities Regulation: The Hot Topics”
(Nov. 21, 2014).
109 See supra section II.A.4 (explaining how professional liquidity providers
protect themselves from better-informed traders in the market by quoting inferior
prices).
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2. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods that
Would Exist if Tiered Dissemination Were Allowed
To be sure, even in a world without the current simultane-
ous-dissemination requirements, there would still be height-
ened information asymmetries in the market following the
release of new information.  But those asymmetries after the
time at which that information would first begin to be exposed
to the market would generally look very different.
Without Reg FD, public companies could reveal their mate-
rial information piecemeal to select traders before sharing it
with the public.  In a hypothetical world in which the regulation
did not exist, then, some information traders would at times be
able to access, analyze, and trade on information before the
market more generally was even aware that it had been re-
leased.  These fortunate traders would no doubt use the infor-
mation to trade profitably as soon as they got their hands on it,
aiming to buy underpriced stocks and sell overpriced ones op-
posite unknowing counterparties—just like in the current
world where simultaneity is required.  Critically, however,
while the select traders with this type of informational advan-
tage would want to act on the advantage before it dissipates,
they would also have an incentive to attempt to trade under the
radar in smaller increments over time.  This type of trading
approach would allow them to accumulate larger positions
before their trading moves prices.  This makes sense.  If they
instead pursued a fast-and-furious approach to trading like the
one that must occur in post-(simultaneous) release periods to-
day, then their own market activity would tip their hands to the
market—thereby eliminating their informational advantage.
Thus, they would try to build up their trading position over
time with quiet, yet sustained, trading.110
Recent empirical study supports the notion that trading
takes place in this manner when traders know that they have
access to information significantly ahead of the time at which it
will become more widely available.  In fact, “significantly ahead
of time” may include time-based advantages limited to a few
minutes.111
110 Recent empirical work evidences this phenomenon. See Rene´ Caldentey &
Ennio Stacchetti, Insider Trading with a Random Deadline, 78 ECONOMETRICA 245,
245–48 (2010).
111 See Jackson et al., supra note 19, at 4, 25–26 (showing that when traders R
had an informational advantage based on early access to EDGAR filings in
2014–2015 that was expected to last a few minutes, as opposed to seconds, they
spread out their trading throughout those minutes to avoid signaling their infor-
mation to the market).
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These observations give rise to the inference that informa-
tion asymmetries in the stock market would be higher than
normal after the first stages of (tiered) information release in
this hypothetical world in which tiered information revelation
were allowed.  However, because the concern for the dissipa-
tion of the informational advantage does not dominate as it
does when information must be disseminated to all at once, we
should expect only slightly heightened asymmetry over the
weeks, days, hours, and even minutes leading up to the time at
which the information is expected to be announced to the pub-
lic.  The exact length of the period of heightened information
asymmetry would depend on just how far ahead the initial
tiered releases of the information began before the full public
release of the information.
Of paramount importance, though, so long as the earlier
releases occurred more than a handful of seconds or even min-
utes before the full public release, the information asymmetry
would be of low-grade variety throughout a sustained period.
After all, the portfolio trading that dominates normal times112
would generally continue on throughout these periods.  Indeed,
if the post-(tiered) release trading by information traders is
spread out over enough time, an enormous number of portfolio
traders would come and go in and out of the market through-
out that time.113  Thus, with the overwhelming majority of all
activity in the market still attributable to non-information-
based trading during these periods, there would only be a
slightly higher chance than normal for any given trader to find
himself at an informational disadvantage in the market.
Accordingly, in a world in which corporate information may
be revealed piecemeal without restraint, market-moving infor-
mation would often leak out over time—and, in contrast to
today’s post-release bursts, would then involve only slightly
heightened information asymmetries distributed in a relatively
smooth manner over a relatively large period of time leading up
to the one at which the underlying information became more
broadly available.
Of course, post-(tiered) release trading in a world without
the NYAG’s equal-timing effort would look different.  In that
world, some information would merely be released to some
traders seconds before being disseminated to the entire mar-
ketplace.  So, information asymmetries during those seconds
would be hefty.  And because so much of the import of the
112 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. R
113 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. R
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information would likely be incorporated into prices within
those seconds-early periods alone,114 the information asymme-
tries associated with more normal times would return soon
enough.  In fact, this is just what happened when the Univer-
sity of Michigan released its market-moving index early to high-
speed traders in 2013 and 2014 before the NYAG put an end to
that practice: the new information in the index was routinely
incorporated into prices in just the first 200 milliseconds of the
two-second-early release, with trading then quickly returning
to normal.115
Lastly, the information asymmetries in a post-(tiered) re-
lease market when trading based on seconds- or minutes-early
access to EDGAR filings or the like is permitted looks similar—
albeit with the acute asymmetries spread out over more than
merely two seconds or so.  This conclusion flows from the fact
that EDGAR filings were often released by far more than merely
two seconds in advance (with many coming in at more like
three-to-five minutes), and that knowledge of the early-release
did not seem to be widely known.  So, information traders with
somewhat secretive access to these types of “public” filings
before the public gained access to them would likely be able to
complete their trading slowly throughout, for example, an
early-advantage minute or two.  In fact, recent empirical study
evidences just this type of trading by information traders when
those traders had several minutes to complete their early-peak
trading based on these filings as opposed to some far smaller
amount of time.116
3. Conclusion as to the Overall Effects of Simultaneity on
Information Asymmetries Today
The above comparisons of the behavior of information trad-
ers in a world with and without the types of existing equal-
timing requirements examined here makes clear that those re-
quirements have considerable effects on the asymmetry in in-
formation known by information traders and all other
participants in the market after information is released.  But
with this background on those asymmetries in both a world
with and without these requirements, the overall general im-
114 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and R
accompanying text.
115 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and R
accompanying text.
116 Jackson et al., supra note 19, evidence this drawn-out-trading result for R
such longer early releases when studying these very SEC releases; see supra
section I.A.2 (discussing this trading dynamic more generally).
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pact of those efforts on information asymmetries both before
and after new information is released becomes clear.
At the outset, Reg FD has eliminated much trading based
on material, non-public corporate information that was previ-
ously taking place in the hours, days, and weeks leading up to
the time at which the information was being released to the
public.117  Consequently, if tiered dissemination were instead
allowed over this sustained period today, information produc-
ers would begin to selectively release their information well
before its public announcement.  Asymmetries between infor-
mation traders and all other market participants would there-
fore be higher than normal during those post-(tiered) release
periods.  That is simply our hypothetical world in which tiered
dissemination is allowed.118  What this means is that by ban-
ning the once-common practice of tiered dissemination of cor-
porate disclosures, Reg FD slightly reduces information
asymmetries throughout prolonged periods that take place
before information is first released (to all at once) today.
But these improvements in information asymmetry are not
free.  Rather, there is a trade-off.  In suppressing information
trading in the period leading up to the mandatory widespread
release of corporate disclosures, Reg FD causes there to be
markedly higher asymmetries during brief post-release periods.
This conclusion is simply the one presented earlier: that the
regulation creates these bursts of information asymmetry by
preventing new information and much (or even any) of its im-
port from seeping out through earlier tiered dissemination, and
then leaves information traders without the luxury of time to
complete their trading in an under-the-radar fashion.119
Combining these two insights allows us to offer the follow-
ing theoretical conclusion about Reg FD’s general effect on in-
formation asymmetries in the market around the times at
which new information is released today: the law results in
asymmetries throughout prolonged periods that are slightly
lower than they otherwise would be in the period leading up to
full releases of new information (because much information
trading is suppressed during that period), yet markedly higher
ones in the period that takes place just after those full releases
(because the information comes out with a burst of trading
117 See supra section III.A.1 (describing the type of selective-release trading
that Reg FD eliminated).
118 See supra section III.A.2.
119 See supra section III.A.1.
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when it must be made available to all at once when first
released).
The related simultaneity initiative by the NYAG has a dis-
tinct effect on information asymmetries in the market.  When
some select group of information traders receives market-mov-
ing information two seconds before it is revealed to the market
as a whole, its members know that they have only two seconds
to capture their informational advantage.120  Those privileged
traders therefore transact ferociously during their early-peek
window—meaning that there will be markedly higher informa-
tion asymmetries during those tiny periods that occur just
prior to the full public release of the information at issue.
When the information is then more broadly released two
seconds later, it has already begun to be incorporated into
market prices.  In fact, if material aspects of the new informa-
tion are computer readable and their import is clear enough,
the information will be incorporated into market prices in just a
small fraction of that two-second window.121  So, the Attorney
General’s effort does little more than move the point at which
brief periods of acute information asymmetries start forward in
time from one moment (e.g., the two-second period just prior to
10:00 a.m.) to another that occurs just seconds later (e.g., the
two-second period that begins with the one and only public
release at 10:00 a.m. sharp).
The SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative to clean up EDGAR filings
has effects that fall somewhere between those of Reg FD and
the NYAG action.  However close it falls to either depends on
the length of the early release that is being eliminated as well as
the market’s awareness of the early release itself.  The effects of
its elimination of minutes-early releases of important informa-
tion might loosely mirror those of Reg FD.  But it is clear that at
least the end of early releases that lasted mere seconds did
little more than move information asymmetries by that very
small amount of time, just as with the NYAG action.
Thus, the likely general overall effects of Reg FD and recent
related legal initiatives on information asymmetries in the mar-
ket around the time at which new information is released are
clear.  Reg FD leads to slightly smaller asymmetries during
prolonged Reg FD pre-release periods, yet markedly higher
ones during brief Reg FD post-release ones.  The NYAG’s initia-
tive from the past few years simply moves a period of acute
120 See supra section I.A.2.
121 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 1–6; supra notes 45–47 and accompanying R
text.
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information asymmetry from, for example, the two seconds just
prior to the public revelation of information to the two seconds
just after it.  Finally, to the extent that it stops tiered dissemi-
nations in the seconds-long range, the SEC’s recent initiative to
clean up its release of public-company filings likely affects
these asymmetries in a similar way to the way in which the
NYAG’s action affects them.  But to the extent that the effort
stops opaque early releases better measured in minutes, its
effects begin to look more like that of Reg FD.
B. Effects on the Wellbeing of Specific Groups of Ordinary
Investors
In this section, we build on our general model of IDL-re-
lated information asymmetries by examining how the effects of
Reg FD, the NYAG action, and the 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR
initiative affect the wellbeing of ordinary investors.  Specifically,
we split the universe of ordinary investors into three groups
based on how they trade, and use our conclusions from above
to see how the law affects each.  By undertaking this analysis,
we do something that the proponents of these aspects of IDL
apparently have failed to do: understand the extent to which
they are theoretically sound given their principal aim.  In the
end, we conclude that despite regulators’ apparent failure to
think about the actual effects of their efforts on ordinary inves-
tors, there is reason to believe that at least Reg FD nevertheless
holds some promise for many ordinary investors.  But at the
same time, it also becomes evident that both it and the other
two main efforts in the area likely harm the most vulnerable
ordinary investors.  These understandings—as well as the
more general ones laid out just above—provide valuable in-
sights for anyone interested in crafting IDL that better achieves
its principal stated ends.  They also pave the way for us to offer
reforms to IDL that would unequivocally better achieve those
ends in the next, final Part of this Article.
1. Group #1: Ordinary Investors Who Engage in Portfolio
Trading at Random Times
Portfolio traders do not trade based on information.122  So
whether, for example, the individuals who engage in portfolio
trading directly do so before or after news comes out and re-
sults in changes to market prices is about as relevant to them,
ex ante, as whether they trade before or after they break for
122 See supra section II.A.2.
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lunch.  Before they trade, that sandwich-and-soda delay may
cost them thousands, or may save them thousands—but each
outcome has an equal chance of occurring.  So, they can ac-
complish their rebalancing and similar trading by purchasing
and selling when they please, without any rush dictated by the
availability of new information.  (They still may want to trade
sooner rather than later for a number of reasons—including to
avoid being in an unbalanced investment position for, for ex-
ample, days beyond the time at which they realize they are in
one.)  Ultimately, then, the great majority of these traders will
not time their submission of buy-and-sell orders based on
when they expect new information to be released.  Indeed, it
would be tough for them to do so given the sheer number of
potentially important information releases.  Instead, they will
trade independently of the time at which information is ex-
pected to be released.
Reg FD, once again, likely results in the market being char-
acterized by slightly lower information asymmetries through-
out prolonged periods before new information is broadly
disseminated, yet markedly higher ones during brief periods
just after that public (simultaneous) dissemination.123  Conse-
quently, those Group #1 investors whose portfolio trading hap-
pens to involve buying and selling in the long Reg FD pre-
release periods today will incur IA costs that are slightly lower
than the ones they would in the same (pre-public-release) time
periods in a world without the regulation.  But, that enhance-
ment to ordinary-investor wellbeing comes at a cost: Many un-
fortunate Group #1 investors who engage in portfolio trading in
a Reg FD brief post-release window will suffer the markedly
higher costs associated with those dangerous periods.
For any of this first group of ordinary investors, the
chances of being left better off as a result of a trade being
executed during a long pre-release period in which information
asymmetries are lower than they otherwise would be because
of Reg FD are undoubtedly higher than that of transacting in a
brief Reg FD post-release danger zone.  The SEC regulation
therefore likely leaves these investors better off in most of their
transactions—but only slightly so.  In contrast, many of the
unlucky investors in this group whose trading stumbles into
the moments just after information is released today are left
significantly worse off due to the intensity of the information
123 See supra section III.A.3.
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asymmetry that is compacted into them.  They incur critically
higher IA costs.
Ultimately, Reg FD’s implications for these Group #1 inves-
tors’ wellbeing are ambiguous, as the relative magnitudes and
probabilities of the pre-release boon to their welfare and the
brief post-release harm to the same are unknown.  Specifically,
the implications turn on the size of the aggregate pre-release
help to ordinary investors relative to that of the aggregate post-
release harm.  The relative size of each is an empirical question.
But at present, it is safe to say that the SEC—which apparently
failed to spot these issues—appears to have no basis to claim
that Reg FD leaves ordinary investors better off.
Interestingly, though, the SEC may have nevertheless
stumbled upon regulation that can actually help these ordinary
investors in a meaningful way.  Savvy portfolio trading can
shield ordinary investors from circumscribed periods of height-
ened information asymmetry—even when their trading takes
place at random times and without any effort to detect post-
release windows.  Those savvy traders who seek to avoid com-
pleting their non-time-sensitive trading during periods where
information asymmetries are high—all the while without en-
gaging in any market intelligence work whatsoever—can deploy
a relatively simple trading technique in order to protect them-
selves from the markedly inferior liquidity-provider prices asso-
ciated with relatively brief periods of acute information
asymmetry: they can seek to accomplish their trading via im-
mediate-or-cancel limit orders with a limit price that reflects
the liquidity-provider pricing associated with normal times.  By
doing so, they ensure that their order to buy or sell either
transacts at a price that reflects only lower-grade information
asymmetries, or gets cancelled immediately.
To explain, imagine that a stock is trading at a $10.48 best
(highest) bid price and $10.52 best (lowest) ask price around a
then-current market value of $10.50 per share.  And imagine
that this liquidity-provider pricing with a four-cent bid-ask
spread is a typical one for this stock—that is, it reflects the
normal asymmetries in information about the stock’s value
known by information traders versus that known by all other
traders.124  The savvy portfolio trader can submit an order to
buy the stock at $10.52, but place a limit price of $10.52 on
that order to make sure that it transacts at a price no higher
than that limit price.  If new information hits the market in
124 See supra subpart II.B (discussing the role of information asymmetry in the
setting of these market prices).
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between the time at which the savvy trader looked at market
quotes and that at which her order reaches a trading platform,
liquidity providers might adjust the quality of their price quotes
downward: to, say, $10.00 best (highest) bid prices and $11.00
best (lowest) ask prices around that same $10.50 market value.
Such a large downward adjustment in the quality of their price
quotes would help protect them from being adversely selected
by better-informed traders.125  But thanks to the limit price of
$10.52, the trader’s order to buy will be cancelled rather than
transacting at an inferior $11.00 best (lowest) ask price.  (As its
name suggests, an “immediate or cancel” order either executes
immediately against a quote, or gets cancelled.)  Within a short
period of time measured by as little as a few seconds,126 the
new information is likely to be incorporated into market prices.
With the information asymmetry ironed out, the trader can
then return to the market to complete her trading at the more
typical liquidity-provider prices, just a couple of pennies off
from the stock’s $10.50 current market value—thereby largely
eliminating the cost associated with the acute post-release in-
formation asymmetry.
Reg FD holds promise to help these ordinary investors be-
cause it makes it more likely that they will be able to use this
trading technique to avoid the costs of post-release information
asymmetry.  This trading tool can be deployed to avoid trans-
acting at markedly inferior prices caused by considerable infor-
mation asymmetry that is condensed into milliseconds,
seconds, and perhaps even minutes or more.  But it is much
less effective—if effective at all—when deployed to avoid the IA
costs associated with sustained periods of low-grade informa-
tion asymmetry that results from information seeping out to
the market slowly.  This is because the liquidity-provider prices
in the market will be only slightly inferior to normal during
those periods, and because those periods are prolonged.127
The submission of an immediate-or-cancel limit order with a
conservative enough limit price may avoid transacting against
a slightly inferior quote, but the trader seeking to avoid that
low-grade information asymmetry would have to do so over a
large enough time period to incur other costs that perhaps
make it not even worthwhile.  With prices inferior by only small
125 See supra section II.A.4 (describing this common liquidity-provider re-
sponse to bursts of information asymmetry today).
126 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and R
accompanying text.
127 See supra section III.A.2.
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amounts over such a long period, even the non-time-sensitive
trading of a portfolio trader would likely prefer to simply pay
the extra, for example, penny per share associated with the
heightened information asymmetry rather than incur the vari-
ous costs associated with holding a sub-optimal portfolio over
days or even weeks.
Thus, Reg FD compacts information asymmetries into a
smaller, acute period—thereby allowing portfolio traders to
protect themselves from much of the bite associated with the
release of new information.  And although we have no reason to
believe that regulators had this in mind when promulgating
Reg FD, this apparent accidental genius of the regulation may
provide a considerable benefit to many Group #1 investors.
We can, however, say that efforts like the one pursued by
the NYAG to stop seconds-early releases will have no net posi-
tive or negative impact on these Group #1 ordinary investors.
To the extent that their portfolio trades are submitted to the
market during, for example, the two seconds before 10:00 a.m.
on a day when market-moving information is being revealed to
the public at that time, ordinary investors are now markedly
better off thanks to the state-level effort.  To the extent those
trades take place in the two seconds just after that release,
they are equally worse off because of the effort.  Those two
effects likely more or less cancel each other out.  All that the
ban does is move the two-second period of intense information
asymmetry—and therefore heightened ordinary-investor IA
cost—from one period to another.
How does the 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR initiative affect
these ordinary investors whose non-time-sensitive trading is
accomplished at random times?  To the extent the effort put an
end to early releases on the order of a mere handful of seconds,
the effect on Group #1 investors mirrors that of the NYAG ac-
tion.  The general result, without considering more, is thus a
wash.  To the extent that it stopped tiered dissemination on the
order of minutes, the effect begins to look closer to that of Reg
FD.
But not all portfolio trading is, like that of Group #1 inves-
tors, randomly timed—including that of our second and third
groups of ordinary investors.
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2. Group #2: Ordinary Investors Who Benefit from
Portfolio Trading that Seeks to Detect and Avoid
the Moments After Information Releases
Despite the steady stream of material disclosures provided
by 5,000 or so public companies in America and the similar
flow of other products with market-moving information, it is
likely that savvy portfolio traders are able to identify when
much new information will come out.  It is also likely that they
became aware of the financial danger presented by the simulta-
neous release of information long before law professors figured
it out.  Although also apparently not by design, Reg FD likely
leaves these ordinary investors facing lower overall IA costs—
thereby providing additional promise for ordinary investors on
the whole.  However, the regulatory action to stop early releases
of a mere handful of minutes or less likely makes no difference
to the IA costs they incur at all.
Reg FD makes it easier for those who seek to detect the
heightened information asymmetries associated with the re-
lease of information to in fact detect them, and therefore makes
it easier to avoid IA costs associated with the same.  This asser-
tion becomes clear by quickly thinking once again about the
information asymmetries in post-release periods in a world
with Reg FD and one without it.  In either world, sophisticated
portfolio traders will attempt to assemble, balance, and liqui-
date pieces of their portfolios outside of the periods that take
place after information begins to be released (whether piece-
meal or to the entire market).  After all, those periods are asso-
ciated with heightened IA costs—whether slightly heightened
(in the case of piecemeal releases)128 or markedly heightened
(in the case of simultaneous ones).129  When successful at do-
ing so, they avoid trading in those high-cost stretches.  It fol-
lows that in a world in which tiered dissemination of corporate
disclosures is allowed with no limit on the duration of the early
release, these savvy traders will try to detect the asymmetries
and avoid trading during the periods.  Likewise, in the current
world, they will try to do the same with respect to the brief post-
release danger zones to which Reg FD gives rise.
Crucially, however, it is almost certainly easier to detect a
brief burst of Reg FD post-release information asymmetry than
a prolonged muted post-(tiered) release one.  In the Reg FD
world, firms are releasing their information at one point in time
128 See supra section III.A.2.
129 See supra section III.A.3.
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to the public, rather than disseminating it piecemeal to select
market participants over the course of hours, days, and even
weeks.  Firms have little incentive to keep mum about such a
full release of information, yet much incentive to stay quiet
about piecemeal ones.  The latter allows the select groups that
received the information to earn larger profits from it, which, if
you gave someone an early look at valuable information, you
might want to allow.  In short, there is more transparency asso-
ciated with full releases of information than piecemeal ones.
Although no law requires such notice, it is thus more likely that
firms will make the timing of those public releases—as opposed
to ones to select groups of information traders—widely known
ahead of time.  Thus, as a matter of theory, Reg FD leaves the
ordinary investors who engage in portfolio trading that seeks to
detect and avoid the moments after information is released
better off with respect to IA costs.
Still, it is important to emphasize a few caveats about this
theoretical Reg FD aid to ordinary investors.  First, as with the
benefit to those who use limit orders to avoid brief Reg FD
bursts of information asymmetry, the one discussed here does
not seem to have driven regulatory action in the area.  Second,
Reg FD (and current IDL more broadly) contains no notice pro-
vision with respect to the release of new information.  Instead,
it merely requires corporations to make information available
to everyone when they first release it beyond the firm.  As a
result, even these traders’ ability to predict the timing of Reg
FD danger zones is far from perfect.  So, while some ordinary
investors may be able to benefit by moving their relatively non-
time-sensitive trading outside these post-release danger zones,
most will no doubt find themselves blindsided by them from
time to time as the stream of new information flows to the
market without any notice whatsoever.130  Lastly, this particu-
130 Professional liquidity providers engage in similar detection and avoidance
techniques. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.  But, they are better R
positioned than even sophisticated ordinary investors to do so.  Once again, read-
ing the news is not part of their business. See supra note 99 and accompanying R
text.  Instead, they learn information from the flow of buy and sell orders sent
their way.  To mitigate their losses to those who do focus their business on di-
gesting news, they design algorithms that detect the type of abnormal trading
activity associated with information trading.  For instance, a flurry of buy orders
may suggest to liquidity providers that their prices are too low.  In response, the
algorithm dictates that they will not just increase their valuation of the stock, but
also that they should consider quoting inferior prices around it for as little as a
second or so until the market returns to its more normal two-sided flow of incom-
ing buy and sell orders. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.  Thus, R
they are able to indirectly detect and avoid many post-release dangers in a way in
which even savvy portfolio traders are less likely able to.
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lar Reg FD boon to ordinary investors is only available to those
who engage in efforts to detect information asymmetries in the
market.  Many ordinary investors—such as those Group #1
investors who seek to avoid IA costs through the use of con-
servative limit orders—either find such efforts unprofitable or
lack the sophistication to use them effectively.
Still, the result for these Group #2 investors is quite differ-
ent when it comes to the effect of the NYAG initiative.  Sophisti-
cated traders who benefit from portfolio trading that detects
and avoids the moments after information release will be unaf-
fected by that “investor protection” work.  They will be just as
likely to be able to detect the impending two-second-early re-
lease of informational products at 9:59:58 a.m. as they are to
be able to detect a simultaneous public release of the same two
seconds later at 10:00 a.m. sharp.  There is no reason to believe
that those seconds-early releases were any easier or harder to
detect than today’s perfectly simultaneous ones.  The same
principle applies to the SEC initiative relating to the seconds-
and minutes-early releases of corporate filings.131  Thus, those
recent campaigns likely leave Group #2 investors no better or
worse off.
In sum, as a matter of theory, Reg FD leaves some fortu-
nate Group #2 ordinary investors better off—even if their avoid-
ance and detection abilities are limited and such avoidance and
detection was not foreseen when promulgating the regulation.
And mere seconds- and minutes-early simultaneity efforts like
those embodied by more recent work by the NYAG and SEC
make little difference for even these fortunate ordinary
investors.
However, all of these legal efforts have yet another (and
here perverse) previously unidentified effect on ordinary inves-
tors.  This effect is specific to our third and final group of ordi-
nary investors, which we turn to next.  And it includes both an
effect on ordinary-investor IA costs and their general wellbeing
more broadly.
131 Interestingly, to the extent that Reg FD stops mere seconds- and minutes-
early releases (or perhaps even hours-early ones), the result is more or less the
same: little to no benefit for even these Group #2 investors.  This means that it is
only Reg FD’s preclusion of larger-scale practices of tiered dissemination that
helps these investors.
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3. Group #3: Ordinary Investors Who Are Duped into
Portfolio Trading or Noise Trading in the Moments
After Information Releases
Many ordinary investors intentionally engage in their di-
rect trading through retail-level brokerage accounts in the mo-
ments after market-moving information is released.  These
individuals generally lack institutional-level resources and so-
phistication.  It is thus these investors who are most vulnerable
to the unfairness about which policymakers have long been so
concerned in the IDL area as well as the securities context
more generally.132  Yet, for two reasons, both Reg FD and the
related efforts from the past few years likely increase the size of
this third group of ordinary investors.  The end result is both
an increase in the amount of IA costs incurred by these individ-
uals, as well as a more general decrease to their wellbeing.133
All of the equal-timing mandates under examination pro-
mote a misunderstanding that likely has an important negative
effect on many individual investors.  The misunderstanding is
that the law has evened the playing field between them and
sophisticated information traders when it comes to trading
based on the information in market-moving disclosures and
the like.  The misunderstanding is, well, understandable: the
playing-field-is-leveled message is the precise one that regula-
tors sought to deliver and are delivering.  Regulators told these
investors that they were now on equal footing with all other
market participants when it came to first access to this
information.134
But the result of this perhaps technically accurate, yet
substantively misleading, message is perverse, as adherence to
this mythical view of securities markets leads many of these
investors to conduct their portfolio trading in the moments just
after firms and other entities disseminate new information.  It
is in those very moments in which these individuals are most
susceptible to the information asymmetry that imposes costs
on them.  So, simultaneous-dissemination requirements in-
crease IA costs for the many ordinary investors in this group by
132 See supra subpart II.A.
133 A good number of the 11,000-plus investment funds in the United States
no doubt act in the same way when trading on behalf of ordinary investors. See
Delevingne, supra note 87 (noting the number of funds in the United states). R
However, for the sake of brevity, and because the policymaker concern for ordi-
nary investors that motivates simultaneity efforts focuses so much on these di-
rect-trading individual investors, we focus only on the latter here.
134 See supra subpart I.B.
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duping them into conducting their portfolio trading in post-
release danger zones.
But the problem here is even larger than that presented by
simply the increased IA costs in focus thus far.  All three of the
requirements examined here encourage these same individuals
to depart from the rational world of portfolio trading, and to
enter the irrational one of noise trading.  Once again, rules
requiring that new information be made available to all inves-
tors at the same exact time when first revealed beyond the firm
or the like reinforce the view that there is a level playing field
among various trader types when it comes to the ability to
procure, analyze, and trade on newly announced information.
This view is largely erroneous.
Few individuals can simply flip a switch and become suc-
cessful information traders.  In fact, even the intermediary
funds through which so many ordinary individuals invest
would be hard pressed to compete as information traders with
respect to this specific type of information.  Corporate disclo-
sures and similar informational products are often simply an-
nouncements of valuable information (e.g., the financial
statement in the 10-Q states that earnings came in at $2.00
per share, thus beating market estimates by $1.00 per share).
That information often has a fairly clear consensus import for
the market prices (e.g., those prices likely undervalue the com-
pany by $0.10 per share).  In at least today’s world of highly
evolved electronic trading, it is likely that only one specific type
of information trader is able to profit on the basis of the release
of such computer-readable information.  That trader is the
high-speed announcement trader.135  And there are rumored to
be only two dozen or so of these speedsters.  So, when informa-
tion producers disseminate their material information to the
public in compliance with current law by releasing it to all
market participants at the exact same time, it is often only
these ones who are able to profitably trade on it right away.
But even if direct-trading individuals could compete on
speed, they would likely be better off by following a buy-and-
hold strategy of portfolio diversification.  This is one of the cen-
tral implications of the two pillars of modern corporate finance:
Modern Portfolio Theory and the Efficient Capital Markets Hy-
pothesis.136  And the lesson that arises out of them pertains to
almost all investors who fall outside a group consisting of pro-
135 See supra section II.A.1 (providing an overview of this sub-type of informa-
tion trader).
136 See supra note 80. R
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fessionals whose primary business is making information-
based trades in the stock market.  Thus, whether or not the
information at issue is computer-readable and profitable for
only a handful of highly sophisticated traders, leaving the
world of portfolio trading to attempt to compete with profes-
sional information traders on the analysis of newly disclosed
information is, at best, ill-advised for individual investors.  Yet
the way in which the law regulates the dissemination of mar-
ket-moving information today paradoxically encourages just
that behavior.
In sum, those ordinary investors who—emboldened by
equal-timing requirements—intentionally conduct their direct
trading as portfolio traders or noise traders in post-release
danger zones are harmed by those requirements.  And the
policymakers behind these laws who primarily sought to help
ordinary investors should find those results disconcerting.  Af-
ter all, it is these individuals who are most susceptible to the
costs associated with a market in which some participants will
inevitably be better informed than others, and it is also these
individuals who often sit precariously on the line that divides
those who engage in portfolio trading that generally enhances
their welfare from those who engage in noise trading that gen-
erally erodes it.
* * *
This Part has demonstrated a simple truth: the actual ef-
fects of Reg FD and related efforts on ordinary investors are far
more complicated than simple policymaker statements about
their allegedly beneficial effects on them reflect.  More specifi-
cally, the nuanced analysis presented here has shown what
fairness-inspired simultaneity efforts actually do to the trading
environment around the times at which the information is an-
nounced to the market—and, ultimately, what that means for
the investors who are alleged to be the principal beneficiaries of
them.  Remarkably, if enough ordinary-investor trading takes
place in the moments after new information is released, then
Reg FD’s equal-access regulation is actually making market
participation less profitable for these investors despite the at-
tempt to improve their lot.  At the end of the day, though, the
relative size of ordinary-investor trading that takes place in
brief Reg FD post-release danger zones versus the amount that
benefits from trading in sustained Reg FD pre-release periods
in which there are slightly lower information asymmetries than
there would otherwise be is an empirical question that sits far
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beyond the scope of this study.  At present, it is safe to say that
there is no basis for concluding that the net of the effects of Reg
FD on ordinary investors is significantly positive.  Likewise, the
negative effect of Reg FD on vulnerable ordinary investors is,
without any dispute, out of line with regulator intentions to
improve their experience as market participants.  Moreover,
that harm presented to those ordinary investors alone may very
well outweigh any of the other theoretical gains we have
identified.
All the while, there is strong reason to conclude that the
net of the effects of related prohibitions on much more circum-
scribed earlier releases from the past few years provides no
benefit to ordinary investors whatsoever.  From at least the
standpoint of market-microstructure economics, the NYAG ac-
tion is worthless for these investors.  In fact, however, from a
broader perspective, it is likely worse than worthless, in that it
no doubt leads to a misimpression about the market among at
least direct-trading individuals, and thus encourages them to
conduct their portfolio trading at the wrong times, and perhaps
even worse, to become noise traders.  Of course, the elimina-
tion of longer early-release periods better measured in minutes
than seconds by the SEC as a result of its cleanup of the
EDGAR system has an impact closer to that of Reg FD.  But
because, when disregarding outliers, it at the high end elimi-
nated only early releases of about a few minutes, its ultimate
impact has the same basic features of the NYAG action.
Still, the magnitude of each of the negative and positive
effects of these simultaneous-dissemination requirements has
not been evidenced in any empirical study with which we are
familiar.  That is not surprising.  We believe this work is the
first to identify them.  But it is safe to say the following: regula-
tors have no more basis to claim that the simultaneity man-
dates that define IDL today improve ordinary-investor welfare
than we have to claim the opposite.  Yet, that defining feature of
IDL has been trumpeted and expanded in recent years.  And in
the next and final Part, we show that our analysis here gives
rise to a simple inference: there are a number of ways in which
IDL could be formulated to definitively achieve its stated ends—
all without the need for any equal-timing whatsoever.
IV
REFORMING IDL WITH AN EYE ON ITS PRINCIPAL STATED GOAL
Simultaneous-dissemination requirements were primarily
set up to make participation in the stock market fairer for
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ordinary investors.137  Yet, our analysis in Part III suggests
that—at a minimum—they present no obvious net benefit to
those investors.  In fact, it demonstrates that some of these
requirements harm at least direct-trading individual investors
in a perverse manner.  But our discussion so far also makes
something else clear: ordinary investors would be left unequiv-
ocally better off if regulation helped them detect and avoid the
IA costs associated with the trading environment after informa-
tion is first released.  It also makes clear that they would be left
better off if regulators, at a minimum, did not indulge in my-
thology relating to the ability of direct-trading individuals to
compete as successful information traders.  So laws that help
investors avoid the costs associated with information release
would boost their wellbeing leaps and bounds beyond whatever
is accomplished by the current bright-line equal-timing re-
quirements found in the law—no matter how rhetorically pleas-
ing they and their equal opportunities sound.  For that reason,
in this final Part, we set forth a series of reforms to show the
following: even if the regulators who set forth the requirements
for equally timed information releases that must happen today
did in fact somehow stumble upon some net benefit to ordinary
investors, the chief goal that drives those requirements can be
far better achieved through more creative uses of IDL.
A. Disclosure of Disclosure
Today, no law restricts public companies and similar infor-
mation producers from releasing their information when they
please, without any advanced notice to the public whatsoever.
For this reason, even savvy ordinary investors no doubt find
themselves harmed by post-release information asymmetries
with some frequency.138  Yet, IDL could contain a simple notice
requirement that would help these investors avoid those asym-
metries—thereby leaving ordinary investors far better off than
they are today.
The exact proposal?  Require information producers to an-
nounce their intention to release any information that stands a
decent chance of moving markets, and to do so well before
making that release.  The law could take a first step along these
lines by requiring public firms to make these types of disclo-
sures in order to inform the market as to when they are releas-
137 See supra Introduction; supra Part I.
138 See supra section III.B.2.
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ing their required disclosures to the market.  We thus refer to
this proposal as one for “disclosure of disclosure.”
In an information-dissemination regime with this type of
notice feature, at least savvy portfolio traders could plan the
timing of their generally non-time-sensitive trading based on
their new knowledge as to when information will be shared.
They would thus exit the market from whenever new informa-
tion was set to be released until the point in time at which the
information was thought to be incorporated into market prices.
Even many not-so-savvy everyday individuals who trade di-
rectly through retail-level brokerage accounts would be able to
do the same—especially if the law required explicit notice to
them through, for example, a warning delivered through their
online brokerage account that popped up before their orders
could be submitted to the market.
Although we focus on disclosure of public-company disclo-
sures as a first step, it bears emphasizing that this reform
could be used to protect ordinary investors with respect to the
dissemination of far more than simply that type of information.
There is no reason why regulators could not apply the concept
to the revelation of the information targeted by the NYAG that
is produced by universities, trade associations, and other enti-
ties—to the extent that they do not already provide notice on
their own accord.  Likewise, it is difficult to see why various
government entities that fail to provide this type of advance
notice of important information releases should not be in-
cluded among the list of information producers that must in-
form the market as to their information-release plans—if the
goal of protecting ordinary investors does in fact dominate
other considerations.  Like the lack of notice associated with
corporate disclosure today, no law requires the producers of
this other important information to alert the market as to their
information-dissemination plans.  Consequently, requiring this
type of notice to the market would not only better protect ordi-
nary investors from the information asymmetries associated
with the release of the information targeted by Reg FD and
related recent simultaneity efforts, but it would also contain
the potential to protect them from a far wider range of those
asymmetries.
To be sure, without some upward limit on the amount of
time in which new information could be dripped out to the
market, any of these types of disclosure-of-disclosure changes
may prove of limited use to portfolio traders that are trying to
avoid dangerous post-release trading environments.  After all,
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if the information producer leaked the information into the
marketplace over a matter of days or weeks starting at noon on
Wednesday, our notice that new information will begin coming
out then might do ordinary investors little good.  This is be-
cause the select traders with first access to the information
might be able to at least tacitly agree to trade slowly under the
radar so that their informational advantage might last over a
sustained period.
Moreover, the mere announcement that market-moving in-
formation will be on its way soon (e.g., in two hours at noon)
may create a loosely related problem: an increase in IA costs
imposed on ordinary investors between the announcement
time (10:00 a.m.) and the first release (noon) alone.  The end
result would be an extension of the length of the problematic
window of information asymmetry to include that time period.
Lastly, with respect to public-company disclosure, there
would also undoubtedly be instances in which the release of
one company’s disclosure would have implications for informa-
tion asymmetries relating to other companies’ stock.  Indeed,
the existence of those instances might be even more common
than their absence.
The law could address all of these concerns without de-
faulting to an insistence on simultaneity.  For example, the law
could merely add an “information-dissemination shot clock”
like the one we discuss below to ensure that the post-release
information asymmetries were contained to an easily avoidable
period of time.  And it could rely on savvy portfolio traders’
understanding, for example, that the expectation of new infor-
mation from Apple from noon to 2:00 p.m. means that they
should stay away from the market for Samsung during those
two hours as well.  But because of these concerns with mere
disclosure of disclosure, if the law is to go down this road of
reforming IDL along these lines to ensure that it actually fur-
thers its primary stated goals, it should prefer a more robust
reform to IDL—like the one we discuss next.
B. Set Information-Release Windows with an Information-
Dissemination Shot Clock
A second, larger reform would be to build on the protec-
tions associated with disclosure of disclosure.  There are many
ways in which regulators could do so.  Here we discuss the
broad contours of one such way: requiring set information-
release windows with an information-dissemination shot clock.
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This reform would involve a requirement that the release of
information occur within circumscribed windows set out in a
transparent manner well ahead of time.  This farther-reaching
change to IDL would provide portfolio traders with notice of
likely periods of high information asymmetry, just as disclo-
sure of disclosure would.
To emphasize the point, the duration of the set information
windows in which information could be released to the market
would have to be capped for the reform to carry out its full
potential.  We refer to such a time-restriction provision as a
“dissemination shot clock.”  This shot clock would give infor-
mation producers a set amount of time to complete their dis-
semination of new information, from initial selective revelation
beyond the firm or the like to the time at which the information
is made available to the public more generally.  Unaccompa-
nied by such a restriction, entities might reveal information
piecemeal over long periods—leaving portfolio traders unable
to identify exactly when within those periods they will be prone
to significantly heightened IA costs.  In fact, if the information
revelation was dribbled out to the market slowly enough, and
the trading based on that dribble undiscernible enough, portfo-
lio traders might have to avoid the market long enough to im-
pede even their generally non-time-sensitive trading goals.
Of course, the clock may be set for as little as a second or
two, as was done by the market in the University of Michigan
example.139  But the clock could also be set for a much longer
duration, perhaps up to a day or more.  The University of Mich-
igan and select information traders may very well have come up
with such an arrangement on their own if not for the fear of
regulatory action or related public-perception issues.
Whether or not the law should allow such a long shot clock
given how information asymmetries could be hidden within the
release period is a different question.  But it is worth noting
that even day-long maximum duration may do the trick.  In
fact, if the shot clock were set toward the longer end of the
spectrum, portfolio traders might even be able to safely enter
the market toward the middle or end of the dissemination win-
dow.  This is because one can assume that information asym-
metries would be greatly reduced by then, after the first
information traders to receive the information transact fast and
139 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. R
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furiously in the early part of the tiered-release window, know-
ing of their circumscribed early-release advantage.140
Whether set for a second or a day, with information revela-
tion restricted to a relatively short, well-defined, and transpar-
ent window along these lines, ordinary investors and those
trading on their behalf with notice as to when that time began
and ended could temporarily exit the market.  That exit would
allow them—at minimum private costs—to avoid much of the
IA costs associated with information release.  They could then
return to the market to complete their portfolio trading as they
please.
Moreover, this second reform would also curtail those peri-
ods in a manner that helps ameliorate all of the issues on
which we touched with respect to mere disclosure of disclosure
alone.  The set windows we envision would be for all informa-
tion producers.  Those market-wide windows could be part of
the structure of stock trading at all exchanges and off-ex-
change trading venues.  For example, they could be but a min-
ute long, and positioned as frequently as on the hour every
hour during the heart of the regular trading day.  That type of
set, transparent information-release window would leave the
beginning and end of regular trading unchanged while also
avoiding the effects of any idiosyncrasies associated with the
opening and closing of the trading day.  Or, the window could
be set for all covered information producers for one hour each
Wednesday, smack in middle of the trading week—thereby ac-
complishing much of the same, albeit perhaps with less distur-
bance of regular trading than that associated with even mere
minute-long releases at the top of all midday trading hours.
Or, lastly, the start times could even be set for after regular
trading hours.
Likewise, the chances of information that is relevant for the
trading environment associated with any given stock being re-
leased are still small.  This means that the extent of any pre-
window information asymmetry would be greatly mitigated.
Thus, the scheduling of, for example, set minute-long informa-
tion-release windows at the start of each trading hour, would
be far less likely to result in any significant buildup of informa-
tion asymmetry toward the end of each hour as would one-off
announcements associated with disclosure of disclosure alone.
140 See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (explaining why information R
traders aim to buy and sell quickly when they anticipate competition and the
informational advantage ending within a small time period).
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Lastly, the temporary, protective retreats we envision
would likely be market-wide given that all new market-moving
information (and not just one firm’s) would have to be released
in these set windows.  This would eliminate the Apple-news-
has-relevance-to-Samsung-stock problem, as portfolio traders
would no longer have that type of challenge with respect to
trying to determine just how widespread their withdrawal from
the market should be when any one individual source of infor-
mation is released.
Of course, if having these set windows of information re-
lease at the top of each midday trading hour (or even once a day
for a few minutes at noon) is too disruptive for ordinary-inves-
tor wellbeing or trading more generally, then the frequency of
those windows could be limited to as little as, for example, one
time per week for all information producers.  Such an informa-
tion-release window could take place each Wednesday from
noon to 1:00.  While this type of interval may at first glance
appear problematic for the flow of information from information
producers to the public, the main benefits to which that flow is
thought to lead (the improved capital allocation and corporate
governance associated with more accurate stock pricing)141 are
unlikely to require prices with more and better information
each and every day.  Indeed, the main law aimed at enhancing
price accuracy in order to improve those ends (mandatory-dis-
closure law) only requires firms to make far-ranging disclo-
sures on their prospects on a periodic basis more easily
measured in fiscal quarters than days.142  Moreover, the law
could of course make an exception for the release of urgent
information, with administrative censure perhaps being
enough to ensure that such an exceptional-circumstances ca-
veat would not be abused.
Thus, instituting set information-release windows with a
maximum information-dissemination shot clock represents a
second, broader way in which IDL could be shaped to leave
ordinary investors far better off than they are today.  All the
while, no law requiring information to be made available to all
market participants at the exact same time would be neces-
sary.  Nor would any additional examination of the nuanced
and hard-to-quantify effects of Reg FD and the related recent
141 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
142 The United States is a periodic-disclosure jurisdiction, meaning firms are
not required to disclose all compelled information as they learn of it on any kind of
continuous basis, but only in an “ongoing, periodic” manner.
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efforts on ordinary investors—which presently are far from
clear and open to substantial critique.
* * *
This final Part demonstrated that IDL can be shaped to
help ordinary investors in a manner far beyond whatever is
accomplished by its current one-dimensional focus on simulta-
neity.  Specifically, it has presented examples of reforms to this
emerging area of the law that would result in unambiguous,
material improvements to ordinary-investor wellbeing.  Thus, it
offered changes to the way in which the revelation of market-
moving information is regulated that would better meet the
primary policymaker goal in the area than the current
unimaginative approach that centers on equally timed dissemi-
nation to all.  And given that there is little basis for concluding
that the current regime and its central attribute do much—if
anything—toward that end, the ideas for change should have
considerable appeal for policymakers.
Of paramount importance, however, whether or not these
reforms are welfare enhancing for society, as opposed to just
one subset of the investing community, is something we have
not analyzed.  Instead, we have taken the law and policymakers
on their own terms—attempting to restrict our focus to the
relatively narrow set of issues relating to the primary stated
goal in each of the simultaneity initiatives in focus here.  We
must therefore caution against irrational exuberance toward
our proposals.  After all, our proposals no doubt have costs.
Whether the ordinary-investor benefits to which they lead out-
weigh those costs is a distinct issue to the ones addressed in
Parts III (whether the defining feature of IDL today enhances
ordinary-investor welfare at all) and IV (whether IDL can be
shaped in a manner that would unambiguously achieve that
end).
What are the main costs of the proposals?
For one thing, by protecting ordinary investors, proposals
like the ones described here take away profits from information
traders—thereby reducing the incentive to engage in price-cor-
recting work on the part of the latter.  The result of implement-
ing the proposals without safeguards for the production of
accurate stock prices might therefore be undesirable.
For another, perhaps perceptions matter more than reality,
and if implemented without still requiring simultaneity, our
proposals would result in harms associated with perceptions of
unfairness.  The feeling—in and of itself—of unfairness associ-
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ated with a major institution in society involving unequal ac-
cess to information represents a social harm.  Moreover, that
social harm might be especially acute when the perceived un-
fairness involves the perception of unevenness between a group
of individuals within the top 1% of wealth in society (here, the
individuals whose money stands behind information traders)
and a group of individuals with more varied financial net
worths.  Additionally, the costs associated with any lower levels
of ordinary-investor confidence in the market that arose out of
the perception might lead to lower levels of ordinary-investor
participation in the market.  The costs of such reduced invest-
ment can be quite serious, including illiquidity, a higher cost of
capital for firms, and a lower level of stock-price accuracy.
We scratch the surface on these considerable concerns
here merely to ensure caution among regulators when pursu-
ing reforms to IDL.  But given these considerable concerns with
even reforms to IDL that unambiguously improve ordinary-in-
vestor wellbeing, we therefore step back to gain perspective and
ask what are perhaps the most important questions of all those
asked thus far: Should IDL even be used in order to help ordi-
nary investors?  And, is its present form fine—albeit for all the
wrong reasons, if you take policymakers at their word with
respect to the primary rationale behind simultaneity today?
Answering this and related questions would require a good
amount of further study.  But as we approach our concluding
thoughts, we note merely the following three broad points.
First, we have discerned an emerging area of securities law that
we believe is analytically distinct from the areas in which it has
been lumped (securities-disclosure law when it comes to Reg
FD, and insider-trading law it comes to at least the NYAG ef-
fort).  Second, that the area’s defining feature today has an
ambiguous and difficult-to-quantify effect on ordinary-investor
wellbeing despite its main stated end.  Third, the area can eas-
ily be shaped to far better achieve that end, for example, by
pursuing the types of reforms we introduced here.  We have
also added caution into the mix due to larger considerations of
securities law—namely, those relating to stock-price accuracy
and (even false) perceptions of ordinary-investor danger.  But
we would be remiss in not bringing up one final intriguing issue
presented by these findings: can this area of law that has been
to date thought of only as a one-trick pony be developed in a
creative way to improve ordinary-investor wellbeing, stock-
price accuracy, and perceptions of fairness all at the same
time?  In addition to taking note of what our journey in this
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paper has revealed in more detail, we touch on this question
and the potential for IDL to be shaped in such a manner to
improve securities law on the whole in the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the market-moving information around
which modern federal securities law has long revolved, policy-
makers and those to whom they appeal have often suffered
from a blind devotion to fairness-inspired legal interventions.
The extent to which the foundation of that body of law
(mandatory-disclosure law) and its two main overlays (securi-
ties-fraud law and insider-trading law) are in fact justified on
fairness grounds has been hotly debated.  Yet despite the con-
troversy, the faith has remained unquestioned when it comes
to the newest addition to this disclosure-based area of the
law—an area that we have named information-dissemination
law.
In this Article, we questioned important securities laws
and the reasoning behind them, taking a first step toward bet-
ter understanding them.  More specifically, we reviewed a se-
ries of regulatory initiatives that have been thus far treated as
discrete.  Stepping back to view them together, however, we
asserted that the efforts were all representative of an emerging
area of law.  And we pointed out that the defining feature of
that area today is found in the requirement that market-mov-
ing information must be made available to all investors at the
same exact time when first revealed.
But, as shown in the Article, the assumption that the pro-
tection of ordinary investors compels the dissemination of such
valuable information to all at once is not supported by the
reality of interactions in the stock market today.  Moreover, the
monolithic focus on simultaneity in IDL has eclipsed the identi-
fication of a broader set of issues relating to how the revelation
of this important information should be regulated, thereby
blocking policymakers from even noticing that there is an area
of law here with fascinating potential uses.
More specifically, we detailed how the hallmark of IDL is
simultaneity in the name of ordinary-investor fairness.  Yet we
showed, as a matter of theory, that the effects of the main
example of IDL (Reg FD) on ordinary investors are far from
clear—and that the regulation perversely left the most vulnera-
ble ordinary investors worse off.  We also explained why at least
one related simultaneity effort from the past few years likely left
ordinary investors worse off altogether.
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Given these findings, the Article presented new ideas for
shaping IDL in order to unequivocally better achieve the pri-
mary regulator goal in the area.  Proposals based on our think-
ing, such as the two concrete ones we set forth, would without
any doubt help everyday investors better avoid the dangers
associated with the revelation of new information to the mar-
ket.  After all, disclosure of disclosure would allow them to
steer clear of town when the slaughterhouse is open for busi-
ness, and set information-release windows with information-
dissemination shot clocks would do the same—albeit with even
broader protections.
There are still of course other fairness-inspired reforms
that are consistent with our thinking.  For example, whether in
addition to one of the above reforms or on its own, there is
something even more basic that the SEC could do that might
be in and of itself more helpful than compelling the simultane-
ous release of information: provide ordinary investors with
some simple information on how to protect themselves from a
market that will be characterized by dangerous information
asymmetries as new important information is being revealed.
More specifically, the SEC—through its Office of Investor Edu-
cation and Advocacy—could engage in an educational cam-
paign.  The campaign we envision would encourage ordinary
investors to participate in the stock market through sophisti-
cated funds that simply index the market rather than on their
own—although other creative similar alternatives on which we
are less bullish exist too (e.g., those associated with educating
individual investors on the use of beneficial trading tech-
niques143).  The educational effort would thus likely both help
reduce the extent to which these investors are harmed by the
information asymmetries associated with the release of new
information, and the extent to which they participate in the
market as noise traders.
But all of these ideas focused on protecting ordinary inves-
tors merely scratch the surface of IDL, as how society regulates
the revelation of market-moving information has implications
that emanate far beyond that one securities-law goal to affect
current thinking about the ends of securities regulation on the
whole.
For one thing, the tenets established in this paper open the
door to the intriguing question posed at the close of Part IV:
Can this emerging area of the law be shaped in a manner that
143 See supra section III.A.1 (discussing one such trading technique that can
sometimes be used by portfolio traders in order to limit the IA costs they incur).
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addresses concerns for ordinary-investor fairness, ordinary-in-
vestor perceptions of unfairness, and stock-price accuracy all
at the same time?  Our inclination is that this question might
be answered in the affirmative.  For example, if tiered dissemi-
nation of new information is not necessary to achieve current
levels of ordinary-investor wellbeing, then why not allow com-
panies to sell early-access rights to their disclosures in a well-
regulated market for early access to corporate disclosures?  If
firms were able to sell early-access products with required dis-
closure of disclosure or within set information-release windows
with information-dissemination shot clocks, then market
forces could go to work in a manner that would provide them
with powerful incentives to produce and share more robust
disclosures than merely those required by mandatory-disclo-
sure law today.  So, the market would get more of the informa-
tion that it wants.  All the while, ordinary investors would be
left far better off than they are today.  Likewise, so long as all
information traders were able to access corporate disclosures
equally at the time of their initial release, any Reg FD-style
concern for the integrity and competitiveness of the price-dis-
covery process144 may be largely muted.
For another thing, thinking about IDL as an area of law
that can be shaped to bring about a number of ends beyond
mere enhanced fairness leads to an additional insight: IDL can
be used to address more than even securities-law issues relat-
ing to the disclosure of information.  For example, set informa-
tion-release windows with an information-dissemination shot
clock could help move insider-trading law forward.  Ordinary-
investor fairness concerns have long animated policymaker ac-
tion in that area of securities law as well—even if most schol-
arly commentators today believe there is no fairness issue
whatsoever.  To the extent that fairness is an issue in that area,
could it not be greatly reduced by implementing a simple re-
quirement that insiders trading based on material, non-public
information must do so during set windows—for example, from
noon to 1:00 each trading day?  Of course, there are other
concerns about allowing insiders to trade based on this infor-
mation (namely ones for stock-price accuracy145).  Whether or
not our information-release windows provide promise to ad-
dress these concerns is an issue far beyond the scope of the
current work.  But it is clear that those windows—at a mini-
mum—would clean up the law by removing much of the need (if
144 See supra subsection I.B.1.c.
145 See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 53. R
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any in the first place) to be concerned for the wellbeing of
ordinary investors that results from insider trading.  Perhaps
most importantly, such an approach might open up space for a
clearer understanding as to why we have insider-trading law in
the first place.  After all, if those windows take care of the
ordinary-investor concern, the limits on insider trading would
presumably have to be supported by consensus thinking on
the practice’s harm to price accuracy or some other social good.
We will stop there with respect to these ideas for reforming
IDL to allow for a well-regulated market for early access to
corporate disclosures or a better insider-trading regime.  The
former part-regulatory-based, part-market-based framework
for the dissemination of new information has price-accuracy
(and other) positive implications that go well beyond the typical
focus of regulators when it comes to the timing of information
dissemination.  And the latter has the potential to address
what has long been one of the most controversial issues in
securities law.  But by introducing the ideas here, we further
contextualize our criticisms of current IDL (namely, its current
monolithic focus and lack of imagination).  And we open the
door for thinking about how IDL can be crafted to better
achieve the larger goals of the field—all the while without
transferring wealth from, at a minimum, the most vulnerable
ordinary investors to professional ones as it does today.
To us, closing with these implications that go far beyond
the effects of Reg FD and the like is a natural consequence of
thinking about IDL as an area of securities law rather than a
simple one-trick pony that works well in sound bites.  To be
sure, we cannot say for certain that the implementation of
some combination of one or more of our IDL proposals would
provide a lower cost means of obtaining the current levels of
ordinary-investor wellbeing.  We likewise cannot say for sure
that any benefits relating to higher levels of ordinary-investor
wellbeing would outweigh their costs.  Likewise, there has been
no study to date of whether or not both ordinary-investor well-
being and price accuracy would be materially improved if firms
were allowed to sell their disclosures in a market for early ac-
cess to corporate disclosures that incorporated the regulatory
safeguards embodied in our thinking on IDL.  And implement-
ing set insider-trading windows could have all sorts of negative
effects on, for example, perceptions in a society where so many
object to the power and wealth of so few.  We leave the analysis
of the desirability of at least wider changes to IDL and the
considerable shift to the approach of modern securities regula-
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tion embodied in them to distinct study.  But we can say that
we have opened the door to thoughtful and valuable innovation
in an area of securities law (information-dissemination law)
that has received little attention relative to the main
mandatory-disclosure, securities-fraud, and insider-trading
law focuses of the field.
Two final concluding points bear mention.  First and fore-
most, it is important to emphasize the drawbacks of imple-
menting our ordinary-investor-friendly proposals.  As we
discussed at the close of Part IV, it is likely that our reforms
have down sides.  For one thing, concerns relating to percep-
tions of unfairness alone might prove to be a recalcitrant en-
emy—no matter what the reality of the situation is.  For
another, trade-offs associated with the incentive to produce
information about firms’ prospects might be unavoidable when
shaping IDL in a manner that protects ordinary investors from
information asymmetries.
Indeed, the latter concern alone raises an important con-
ceptual point for the law.  If the status quo is preferable to our
reforms because of a concern for the ability of information trad-
ers to earn profits from ordinary investors, then the law should
be transparent about its intent.  The continuation of existing
IDL should therefore be justified not based on what it does to
protect ordinary investors, but rather based on how efficiently
it guides lambs to the slaughterhouse to satisfy information-
trading appetites—all in the name of price accuracy.  Ironically,
despite all of the ordinary-investor rhetoric, the main clear ad-
vantage of an information-dissemination regime built on
equally timed access to information over one built on disclo-
sure of disclosure or the like is that the former is better for
funding information traders.  So if the law opts to go with the
status quo because of its importance to the price-discovery
process despite the effects on ordinary investors identified
here, a recognition of the truth of that conclusion among
policymakers and commentators alone would represent an im-
portant step forward for the law in and of itself.
Second, and lastly, on a broader level, our analysis pro-
vides yet another example in the growing pile of examples of
securities-law works that recognize the realities of contempo-
rary securities markets and differentiate between different
types of market participants.146  Taken together, these works
146 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg,
The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 196 (2015)
(describing a conceptual framework of stock market analysis based on “adverse
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and their incorporation of concepts from market-microstruc-
ture economics are providing a force that even the most en-
trenched ideas and government officials will not be able to
resist.  That force is pushing in favor of recognizing that, de-
spite conventional wisdom about irreconcilable differences and
trade-offs among different types of market participants with
different types of goals, those participants can prosperously co-
exist in securities markets.  Adding to this growing literature
represents an important step forward for the law in and of
itself.  Encouraging analysis of the law that is consistent with
reality alone represents progress.
selection, the principle-agent problem, and a multi-venue trading system”); Fox et
al., supra note 73; Haeberle, supra note 67, at 122 (asserting that regulators can R
reform little-noticed stock-market rules to materially improve the accuracy of
public companies’ stock prices); Haeberle, supra note 104; Kevin S. Haeberle & M.
Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure (U. Chi. Coase-
Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper No. 769, 2016), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814125 [https://perma.cc/HXG5-
2C37].
